Affirmative Action after Stotts: The United States Supreme Court\u27s 1985 Term by Broderick, Albert
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 15
Number 2 Volume 15, Number 2 Article 2
4-1-1985
Affirmative Action after Stotts: The United States
Supreme Court's 1985 Term
Albert Broderick
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Broderick, Albert (1985) "Affirmative Action after Stotts: The United States Supreme Court's 1985 Term," North Carolina Central Law
Review: Vol. 15 : No. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss2/2
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER STOTTS: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT'S 1985 TERM
ALBERT BRODERICK*
Lawyers often sense the moment when the United States Supreme
Court is prepared to explicitly reaffirm a doctrine that has long been im-
plicitly accepted or, on the other hand, to distinguish the doctrine out of
existence. Such a moment may be at hand in the Court's 1985 Term with
respect to affirmative action as a remedy for past race and sex discrimina-
tion. Until Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts' in 1984, the
Court had confined itself to fixing limits for affirmative group relief. In
Stotts the majority opinion hinted, for the first time, that affirmative
group relief might henceforth be limited to "specific victims" of discrimi-
nation. The Court has firmly entrenched the "specific victim" require-
ment where individual relief is concerned. However, imposing such a
requirement on group relief could sound the death knell for affirmative
action goals as race-conscious and sex-conscious remedies for egregious
identified discrimation.
This Term, the Supreme Court once again has heard argument on an
affirmative action case.2 Two more affirmative action cases have been
accepted for hearing by the Court.' As of the time of this writing, three
other such cases remain on the Court's 1985 docket,4 their petitions for
certiorari review, as yet, having been neither granted nor denied.5 Friend
* A.B. 1937, Princeton University; LL.B 1941, S.J.D. 1963, Harvard University; D.Phil.
1968, Oxford University; Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University.
1. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 116-138).
2. On November 7, 1985, the Court heard oral argument in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
3. On October 7, 1985, the first day of the 1985 Term, the Court granted certiorari petitions in
Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub. nom. Local Number
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985), and EEOC v. Local 638, 753
F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985). Due to the timing of the granting of these petitions and the writing of
this Article, Vanguards and Local 638 generally will be referred to by their names in the respective
courts of appeals. These cases perhaps will be heard by March 1986.
4. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985),petition for cert. filed 54 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-177); Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.
1984), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. July 16, 1985) (No. 84-1936); Marsh v. Board
of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Mich. 1984), afl'd mem., 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985),pelition for
cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1859).
5. The grant of certiorari constitutes a discretionary determination by the Supreme Court that
it will decide a case from a state's highest court (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982)) or from a
federal court (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982)), after briefing and oral argument. This determi-
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and foe alike anticipate the 1985 Term to be crucial for affirmative action
jurisprudence, which has been unsteady since 1984 and the Court's puz-
zling majority opinion in Stotts. What is at stake in these cases? How is
the Court likely to resolve the issues they present? These are the ques-
tions to be examined here.
The lawyers arguing Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,6 as in
most cases heard by the Court, sought to persuade the Justices that judi-
cial precedents require that the Court should sustain their clients' posi-
tion. In Wygant, that would mean a decision for or against a particular
variety of affirmative action. Will the Court stake out its position in con-
tinuity with its prior decisions? In some instances the Court is asked to
recognize its past positions as erroneous or outdated by more recent de-
velopments or perceptions and to repudiate those positions. In other in-
stances, attorneys will advise the Supreme Court that its past
pronouncements have been read by lower courts too broadly or too nar-
rowly, and that what is needed is not repudiation, but clarification.
In the context of Wygant and the preponderance of federal court cases
which have dealt with "affirmative action" over the past decade, the term
is used as shorthand for plans to remedy past race or sex discrimination.
These plans set certain goals with respect to the hiring or promotion of
the deprived group (e.g., blacks or women). These plans are sometimes
judicially or administratively established after litigation before a court or
a governmental quasi-judicial commission.7 Affirmative action goals are
also established as a remedy for the violation of the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution.8 An affirmative plan might be
incorporated within a consent decree by which adversary parties accept
settlement of litigation in terms of affirmative hiring or promotion goals
found "reasonable" by the court. Sometimes these affirmative action
goals are included voluntarily in collective bargaining agreements be-
tween governmental bodies or private employers and unions. A govern-
mental body or private employer unilaterally might adopt an affirmative
action plan in view of past discrimination that might form the basis of a
race or sex discrimination suit under title VII or equal protection. More-
nation is made when four Justices vote to hear a particular case selected from the multitude of
petitions filed each Term seeking discretionary review (the so-called "Rule of Four"). In other cases
specified by the above statutes a party may have a "right" to an "appeal." A litigant qualifying for
review of a decision via "appeal" is entitled to review by the Supreme Court. However, the Court
has formulated restrictions on an appellant's claim to submit briefs and argue orally before the
Court. For further reference to petitions for certiorari and appeals, see infra notes 195, 443.
6. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984).
7. Such a commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), was estab-
lished by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e(17) (1982).
8. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution applies di-
rectly only to state action. However, since Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case
to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court has held that equal protection
considerations apply against the federal government as a component of fifth amendment due process.
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over, specific national or state legislation, or executive action, can require
or establish such plans. These situations have caused courts to respond
to claims by persons who claim to be disadvantaged by the affirmative
relief which had been given to blacks or women to remedy the disadvan-
tages suffered by these groups because of past discrimination in employ-
ment or some other field. Objections to affirmative action are usually
rooted in either or both of two legal grounds: (1) constitutional (the
equal protection clause); (2) statutory (title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
This article discusses affirmative action relief granted by the federal
courts under title VII and the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion.9 Many affirmative action cases involve judicial determinations
under both title VII and equal protection.1" If a case involves govern-
mental action and employment, then both title VII and equal protection
come into play. In this situation, the Supreme Court strictly mandates
that federal courts give primary consideration to the statutory provision,
reaching the constitutional question only if title VII does not dispose of
the case."1 Part I examines the law of affirmative action in cases of em-
ployment discrimination as applied prior to the 1985 Term. Part II ana-
lyzes the cases pending on the 1985 docket at the time of this writing.
Part III discusses the questions of policy upon which any of the pending
cases may be decided.
I. THE "LAW" To DATE
A. Title VIP" and the Problem of Stotts
13
The Civil Rights Act of 196414 passed by a narrow margin after "the
longest debate"15 on a single piece of legislation in the history of Con-
9. Remedial affirmative action in other federal legislation and in Executive Order 11246, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 28 (1982), as amended by Executive Order
11375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1967), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 28 (1982) (concerning government
contractors), will be discussed only in passing.
10. Some cases necessarily concern only title VII because state governmental action is neces-
sary to trigger the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment (ie., "no State shall...,"
U.S. CoNsT. Amend. V) or the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment (Le., federal governmental action, U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1). Other affirmative
action cases concern only the constitutional ground of equal protection because they do not involve
discrimination in employment, the central area of title VII.
11. Leading reminders by the Supreme Court include Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)
and Siler v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e(17) (1982).
13. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)
to 2000e(17) (1982)).
15. C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT (1985) (detailed account of the building of the coalition and strategy by
which the Act's difficult passage was secured).
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gress.1 6 Its enactment resulted from a Democratic and Republican coali-
tion,1 7 following a sustained campaign of protest against blatant racial
discrimination in private employment and public accommodations by
black and white civil rights leaders.1 8 Momentum for the Act's passage
was furnished by the assassination of President Kennedy, whose Depart-
ment of Justice had introduced the legislation.19 The most formidable
obstacle to passage concerned the public accommodations provision of
title II.2 Surprisingly, the employment discrimination section of the Act
(i.e., title VII) evoked heated debate, but little analysis."1
As originally presented to Congress,22 title VII was directed primarily
16. Introduced on June 19, 1963, the Act passed on July 2, 1964, after 113 days of bard-fought
debate. Id. at 117.
17. The key contributions of two Republicans to passage of the unprecedented legislation, Rep-
resentative William McCulloch of Ohio and Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois, are
dealt with in detail in C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, supra note 15. The pilot of the legislation in the
Senate was the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota.
18. Prominent among these protesters were Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., James Farmer, Roy
Wilkins, Whitney Young, A. Philip Randolph, Clarence Mitchell, and Walter Fauntroy. C.
WHALEN & B. WHALEN, supra note 15, at 216-27. A strong reminder that the civil rights move-
ment was "a disciplined mass movement of Southern blacks," and not just the product of charis-
matic leadership, is given in A. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black
Communities Organizing for Change (1985). This careful sociological study details developments
from the Baton Rouge boycott of 1953, through Montgomery (1955) and the student sit-ins (1957-
60) to the culminating confrontation in Birmingham in 1963 which produced the change of national
climate which made possible the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Professor Morris examines the crucial factors of strategy, popular involvement, and organization.
His central thesis is that the critical organizational center of the civil rights movement was the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) which "functioned as the decentralized arm of
the black church" under the undisputed presidency of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In documents
and in interviews with chief participants (including key local groups in Durham and Greensboro,
N.C.), Morris considers the tensions among various collaborating and often competing black "orga-
nizational forces" such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Student Non-Violent Coor-
dinating Committee (SNCC), and the National Association for Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), and "predominantly white organizations closely allied with the movement" such as the
Highlander Folk School (HFS), the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), and the Fel-
lowship of Reconciliation (FOR). According to Morris, "the black churches were the power cen-
ters," the SCLC was the "force that developed the infrastructure of the civil rights movement," and
Dr. King presided over all with "charismatic authority" and "organizational power." Id. at 77, 93.
19. When President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, the bill was still in com-
mittees. Id. at 69-70. The new president, Lyndon Johnson, made passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 his top legislative priority: "We are not going to have anything else hit the Senate floor until
this bill is passed." Id. at 97. A Senate filibuster was barely defeated by invoking cloture. The final
votes are misleading as to how close a call the battle had been (House: 289-126; Senate: 73-27). Id.
at 226.
20. This section virtually reproduced the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1870, which had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Johnson Administration's strategy of relying on the recently ex-
panded commerce power of the federal government to sustain the constitutionality of the Act proved
successful. The Supreme Court promptly held title II of the Act constitutional in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
21. Title VII, the equal employment provisions, was not in the original civil rights bill.
22. In its original form, title VII was added to the bill by Congressman Peter Rodino of New
Jersey in subcommittee on September 25, 1963. C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, supra note 15, at 35.
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towards racial discrimination. An Equal Pay Act for women had been
passed by Congress the previous year,2 3 and title VII, as introduced, 4
did not bar sex discrimination. The addition of "sex" to "race, religion,
and national origin" was made on the floor of Congress and passed
5
without significant debate. The motion to include "sex" had been made
by a vigorous opponent of the civil rights legislation, "Judge" Howard
W. Smith of South Carolina, who hoped to secure a few needed votes to
block passage of the bill.2 6 Nevertheless, from the outset, title VII pro-
vided that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployee. . . to discriminate against any individual. . because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
'27
To enforce the ban on discrimination, the Act established a federal
commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
to conduct an initial investigation, to settle when possible, and, in the
absence of settlement, to adjudicate claims of discrimination. The Act
provided ultimate access to the courts by the EEOC to enforce its deci-
sion in favor of a claimant, or by claimants on their own.
2 8
Once a claimant established to the satisfaction of a court that he or she
suffered from employment discrimination "because of race, color, sex,
religion or national origin," the Act specified that the court may enjoin
the employer "from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate. The order may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.
2 9
The usual judicial relief given at common law to a successful claimant
was money damages. Equity, when separate from the common law,
found more resourceful remedies.30 In addition to awarding damages for
a nuisance (such as operation of a glue factory in a residential neighbor-
23. The Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56-57 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1982)).
24. See supra note 22.
25. The House vote was 168 to 133. C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, supra note 15, at 117.
26. The Whalens suggest that "the predominately male House of Representatives were self-
righteously indignant at having to take this unexpected stand for or against women." Id. Congress-
woman Katherine St. George, a Republican from New York, had her moment addressing the House
on the motion: "We outlast you-we outlive you-we nag you to death, . . [but] we are entitled to
this little crumb of equality. The addition of the little, terrifying word 's-e-x' will not hurt this
legislation in any way." Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
28. The focus of this discussion is not on the intricacies of the administrative process estab-
lished by the 1964 Act or generous theories developed in the courts to prove "discrimination."
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (emphasis added).
30. For consideration of equity in English law, see the classic work of F. MAITLAND, EQUITY
(1932). Especially, see id. at 237-49, 254-65 (specific performance; injunctions). For treatment of
equity in American law, see R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 10, 155-57
(1938) and R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 64-66 (1954).
5
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hood), a court in equity could also enjoin a defendant from continuing
the nuisance under penalty of contempt and require him to take action to
terminate it. For breach of contract, equity could go beyond the common
law remedy of damages, and in special circumstances, compel him to
carry out a contract. This doctrine was known as specific performance.
When equity and common law courts were combined in both England
and the United States,31 the newly-created courts acquired the old pow-
ers of the common law courts (damages) and the equitable remedy of
specific performance. Generally, the new courts preferred to limit the
specific action they exacted from a defendant to the negative requirement
of an injunction-to cease and desist. Eventually, the courts' use of af-
firmative remedies increased. The shift was masked by continuing to call
the affirmative remedy a "mandatory injunction."32 This affirmative re-
lief was often the only meaningful way of compensating a victim who
sought performance rather than mere damages for non-performance.
The use of the affirmative equitable remedy took on a distinctly
broader scope in American constitutional law in the second half of this
century. This occurred chiefly in three sets of cases in which Supreme
Court decisions sharply broke away from previous institutional patterns.
In the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education,33 the Court found
that the "separate but equal" doctrine, proclaimed in 1896, was indeed a
violation of the constitutional rights of four black plaintiffs and other
aggrieved members of their class to equal protection of the laws in public
education. While a mere award of damages would be inadequate, simply
31. Federal courts had, from the beginning, both "law" and "equity" powers.
The suits in equity of which the federal courts have had 'cognizance' ever since 1789 constituted
the body of law which had been transplanted to this country from the English Court of Chan-
cery ....
.Equitable relief in a federal court is of course subject to restrictions: the suit must be
within the traditional scope of equity as historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery
; a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law must be wanting. . .; explicit Congres-
sional curtailment of equity powers must be respected, see, eg., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat.
70, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be evaded ...
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.) (citations omitted). The
Norris-LaGuardia Act, referred to by Justice Frankfurter, was Congress' response to excessive
grants of ex parte injunctions by federal judges in labor disputes.
32. The overlap between the common law extraordinary remedy (prerogative writ) of manda-
mus and the equitable mandatory injuction was explored by the Supreme Court in Panama Canal
Co. v. Grace Line Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). The following year, in Brown 1I, the Court reaffirmed the
existence of the constitutional violation and remanded the cases to the district courts with directions
that there be "good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955). The last line of the opinion seemed to lessen the urgency while directing the district
courts "to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as
are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed the parties to these [cases]." Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
Fourteen years later, little enough had happened-much was "deliberate"-little evidence of
speed.
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directing that the four victorious plaintiffs and their class members be
admitted to public schools from which they had been barred because of
their race would leave the social blight and constitutional violation in-
tact. The Supreme Court instead remanded the cases to the federal dis-
trict courts to supervise the four states' uprooting of the two-race system
of schools. The wrong to the black plaintiffs required more than their
admission to schools, requiring affirmative directions to defendant school
boards to integrate their entire school systems to foreclose similar injury
to other present and future black children and-let's face it-to repair
the social landscape. The new remedy was put into play (too slowly) in
the form of equitable relief to remedy proven wrongs to the four groups
whose constitutional rights were violated in Brown3".
In 1962, a Tennessee plaintiff in Baker v. Carr35 convinced the Court
that his equal protection right to an "undiluted" vote was violated by a
state arrangement of legislative districts which made his vote count less
than did the vote of a citizen of a less populous district. The equitable
relief directed by the Supreme Court required the defendant state, under
the supervision of the local federal district court, to reapportion its legis-
lative districts so as to prevent future injury to other citizens. This plan
also included those citizens living in districts other than those in which
the victorious plaintiff had been constitutionally deprived. Here again,
the equitable power of the federal court had been enlisted to affirmatively
supervise an equitable reapportionment according to a standard which
the Court soon established: "one person, one vote."13 6 Once more, after
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 set in motion the practical means to stim-
ulate realistically the participation of black citizens in the voting process,
the Court interpreted the statute to prevent voting changes in any state
by reapportionment or any other method which would lessen the potenti-
ality of black citizens to participate in elections and elective office.3 7
In these situations, the Supreme Court viewed its responsibilty to effec-
tively interpret and enforce the Constitution and federal statutes as re-
quiring more than simple individual relief for an aggrieved plaintiff.38
Affirmative steps by local federal courts, through use of their equitable
34. The turning point was Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the
Court spoke out strongly for "speed" and for effective plans to dismantle two segregated systems of
public schools existing side by side (Le., the black and white neighborhood school model). The
vigorous affirmative race-conscious relief to remedy the constitutional violation finally had begun,
going as far as requiring busing as a remedy for the continued presence in the society of the dual
system of schools. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
36. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). See also United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977) (race-conscious voting districts upheld to increase the likelihood of adequate representa-
tion of blacks in the state legislature).
38. The use of these equitable race-conscious remedies for identified discrimination was ex-
pressly approved by the Supreme Court in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
7
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power, were required to translate an important new constitutional doc-
trine into practice, or a wide-ranging federal statute into imminent prac-
tical implementation. As one might guess, widespread mutterings were
heard against this new sweep of power assigned to federal judges.3 9 Ad-
vocates of this broad judicial action argue that the alternative is to have
each plaintiff receive his/her relief case-by-case as they succeed in estab-
lishing themselves as individual "victims." While this approach would
make whole the "specific victims," such one-by-one relief hardly would
insure that large-scale changes in the law would be implemented.'
Congress did not unmistakably design the language of section 706(g)
of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196441 such that an employer
(1978) and two years later in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), provided certain condi-
tions were met.
39. Professor Bickel particularly was incensed at the Court's new initiative:
The general practice is to leave enforcement of judge-made constitutional law to private initia-
tive, and to enforce it case by case, so that no penalties attach to failure to abide by it before
completion of a successful enforcement litigation. This means quite literally that no one is
under any legal obligation to carry out a rule of constitutional law announced by the Supreme
Court until someone else has conducted a successful litigation and obtained a decree directing
him to do so.
A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 111 (1975). Professor Lusky (who as Justice Stone's law
clerk authored the first draft of the celebrated Carolene Products footnote, United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)) generally disagreed with the Court's affirmative thrust,
but he would except from his dissent the school desegregation cases. Disagreeing with Bickel, Lusky
thought the Civil War amendments' (thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth) "one pervading purpose"
required the administrative injunctions in the school cases. L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 230-40, 364 (1975).
40. Cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (Supreme Court's recognition of the
ineffectiveness of one-case-at-a-time enforcement of civil rights in approving the drastic remedies of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-I (1982)). Congress, said the Katzen-
bach Court, "had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persis-
tent discrimination in voting. 383 U.S. at 328. See 0. FIss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION
(1978):
If nothing more is at stake than the formulation of 'labor policy,' as was true with the property
injunction and the labor injunction, then it is fair to assume that the nonrepresentative charac-
ter of the judiciary is a vice. But if the focus shifts to the civil rights injunction, and either the
minority-group orientation or the constitutional basis of the substantive right, then the nonrep-
resentative quality of the judiciary becomes a virtue rather than a vice. Constitutional rights are
supposed to be countermajoritarian, and those emanating from the Equal Protection Clause
particularly so.
Id. at 45.
Professor Fiss summarized the broad equitable relief administered by the federal courts in the
desegregation cases:
[Brown] required new procedures for the assignment of students; new criteria for the construc-
tion of schools; reassignment of faculty; revision of the transportation systems to accommodate
new routes and new distances; reallocation of resources among schools and among new activi-
ties; curriculum modification; increased appropriations; revision of interscholastic sports sched-
ules; new information systems for monitoring the performance of the organization. . ..
Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1979). But see the cutback of the "administrative injunction" by the Supreme Court in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), largely on federalism
grounds (although concern for over-involvement by the federal courts in supervisory functions was
also evident).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
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whose proven racial or sexual discrimination had resulted in an entirely
white male work force should be visited automatically with a judicial
decree mandating that a certain percentage of women or blacks be in-
cluded in his work force, or in various promotion slots, according to a
rigid timetable. On the other hand, no evidence shows that Congress
intended by section 706(g) that only the proven victims be hired and the
offending plant be allowed to continue as before, subject only to one-by-
one judicial attack by subsequent victim plaintiffs. "Affirmative action"
in section 706(g) at least meant that the proven victims be hired or pro-
moted and that they be given their "rightful place" in the seniority order
absent race or sex discrimination.42 This remedy can vault these victims
over the heads of more senior employees to obtain their rightful place.43
This "specific victim" relief was never the complete understanding of
"affirmative action," nor was the affirmative remedy limited to injunctive
relief to discontinue the discrimination. Affirmative action was con-
ceived initially as an element of a judicial decree where race or sex dis-
crimination was proven. Further affirmative relief would aim the
employer in the right direction. Setting hiring or promotional goals with-
out awaiting further individual litigation would lessen the likelihood of
renewed discrimination against blacks or women.' The Act was so in-
42. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). This interpretation was reinforced the
following year in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Teamsters
also indicated that after racial discrimination was proven in violation of title VII, individual mem-
bers of the class would have, in a second phase, the opportunity to prove that they had been "specific
victims" of the identified discrimination. If successful, these victims might receive the Franks relief
and be awarded the seniority for which they were qualified but for the identified racial discrimina-
tion.
Another aspect of Teamsters relates to the seniority provision of title ViI, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1982). The Court held that this section established that a bona fide seniority system
(Le., one not intentionally constructed to be racially discriminatory) would not be prejudiced solely
because such system tended to perpetuate pre-Act racial discrimination. Franks retroactive senior-
ity relief still would be available to victims of post-Act discrimination at the plant, but plaintiffs
could not rely on the discriminatory effect of a "bona fide" seniority system. This part of the Team-
sters decision set aside the long-standing contrary interpretation of § 703(h) by the courts of appeals,
as Justice Marshall underscored in a ringing dissent. Id. at 378-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. The "rightful place," "make whole" relief is available to victims only if the discrimination
took place after the effective date of the Act (July 1, 1965).
44. A grasp of the distinction between the accepted scope of "specific victim" analysis in
Franks and Teamsters, and the possible extension of such analysis to affirmative action goals, sug-
gested by Justice White's opinion in Stotts, is crucial to understanding the issues presented by the
cases pending before the Supreme Court which are discussed in this study. Justice Blackmun's ex-
planation is worth repetition:
In determining the nature of 'appropriate' relief under § 706(g), courts have distinguished be-
tween individual relief and race-conscious class relief. . . .In a Title VII class-action suit . ..
an individual plaintiff is entitled to an award of individual relief only if he can establish that he
was the victim of discrimination. That requirement grows out of the general equitable princi-
ples of 'make whole' relief; an individual who has suffered no injury is not entitled to an individ-
ual award. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-348, 364-376, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1860-
1861, 1869-1872, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). If victimization is shown, however, an individual is
entitled to whatever retroactive seniority, backpay, and promotions are consistent with the stat-
9
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terpreted by many lower federal courts from the beginning. 4" Was this
interpretation correct? When the Supreme Court finally addressed this
question in 1978,46 the answer was "sometimes" rather than "no".
From the beginning, title VII was written and understood as barring
any race discrimination-by blacks as well as whites-and any sex dis-
crimination-by women as well as men. This interpretation was ques-
tioned by defendants in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.47
in 1976. Justice Marshall, in a unanimous opinion for the Court, defini-
tively proclaimed, "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the
white petitioners in this case, upon the same standards as would be appli-
cable were they Negroes and Jackson [the black employee] white."4"
Justice Marshall stated further: "There is no exception in the terms of
the Act for isolated cases; on the contrary, 'Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination, subtle or otherwise.' "" At this point, Justice Marshall
specified that "Santa Fe disclaims that the actions challenged here were
any part of an affirmative action program. . . ."0 Would such an affirm-
ative action program pass muster under title VII? The Court saved that
question for another day: "[W]e emphasize that we do not consider here
the permissibility of such a program, whether judicially required or
otherwise prompted."51
ute's goal of making the victim whole. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747,
762-770, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1263-1266, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) ...
In Title VII class-action suits, the Courts of Appeals are unanimously of the view that race-
conscious affirmative relief can also be 'appropriate' under § 706(g) [citing courts of appeals
cases and referring to Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301-02 (Powell, J.) and id. at 353 n.28 (Brennan, J.)]
. . .The purpose of such relief is not to make whole any particular individual, but rather to
remedy the present class-wide effects of past discrimination or to prevent similar discrimination
in the future. Because the discrimination sought to be alleviated by race-conscious relief is the
class-wide effects of past discrimination, rather than discrimination against identified members
of the class, such relief is provided to the class as a whole rather than to its individual members.
*. .The distinguishing feature of race-conscious relief is that no individual member of the dis-
advantaged class has a claim to it, and individual beneficiaries of the relief need not show that
they are themselves victims of the discrimination for which the relief was granted.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2605-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). Justice Blackmun's statement of the distinction can hardly be challenged. Open
to debate, both here and at the Court, is whether the Supreme Court should extend Franks-Team-
sters' "specific victim" analysis to bar race-conscious group relief as a remedy for identified past
racial discrimination against a racial group.
45. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975); Vulcan Society v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973). But see Kirk-
land v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 268 (1978) (equal protection) (discussed
infra note 60 and at text accompanying notes 142-151. The Court's first title VII consideration of
affirmative action goals awaited United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (discussed infra
note 60 and at text accompanying notes 52-78).
47. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
48. Id. at 280.
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1. United Steelworkers v. Weber 2
"Another day" came three years later in 1979. At the center of the
current affirmative action debate, Weber is the only Supreme Court deci-
sion that specifically has upheld a title VII affirmative action plan that
provided for race-conscious goals "to eliminate manifest racial imbal-
ances in traditionally segregated job categories." 3
Prior to 1974 only 1.83% of the skilled craft workers were black at the
Kaiser plant in Gramercy, Louisiana, while the work force in Gramercy
was 39% black. The United Steelworkers of America, Kaiser, and the
national union representing employees at fifteen Kaiser plants included
in their national collective bargaining agreement "an affirmative action
plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's then
almost exclusively white craftwork forces."54 On-the-job training plans
were established to train unskilled workers already employed by Kaiser
for higher-paying jobs. Trainees were selected "on the basis of seniority
with the proviso that at least fifty percent of the new trainees were to be
black until the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy
plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force."55
Brian Weber, a white employee who was senior to some of the blacks
selected for the training program,5 6 sought an injunction against Kaiser
and the union, alleging that the plan constituted an "employment prefer-
ence based on race" in violation of title VII. The district court granted
the injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed, upholding the "voluntary" plan as permitted by title VII.
The Court entered certain disclaimers at the outset of its decision.
One was that the case did not raise equal protection or any other consti-
tutional issue because no state action was involved, only private non-
governmental action. Another was that the plan did not concern "what
a court might order to remedy a past proved violation of the Act."57
While squarely rejecting the argument that "Congress intended in Title
VII to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans,"58 the Court
disavowed any design to "define in detail the line of demarcation between
permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans."59 Despite this
last disclaimer, in upholding the Kaiser plan the Court furnished stan-
dards which have been used by the courts of appeals in many cases,'
52. 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
53. Id. at 197.
54. Id. at 198.
55. Id. at 199.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 200.
58. Id. at 201.
59. Id. at 208.
60. See cases cited infra note 81 (courts of appeals cases using race- or sex-conscious affirmative
11
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(and by the Supreme Court the following year in Fullilove v. Klutznick6 t)
as working criteria to separate "permissible and impermissible affirma-
tive action plans."62
The Court noted that both the Kaiser plan and title VII "were
designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierar-
chy."163  Both were structured to "open employment opportunities for
Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."'
The Court said, "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was with the plight of the Negro in our economy."65 Citing unemploy-
ment figures before Congress as title VII was enacted, the Court recalled
that "[i]n 1947 the non-white unemployment rate was only 64% higher
than the white rate; in 1962 (two years before enactment) it was 124%
higher.",66 Again, "Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights
Act-the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American soci-
ety--could not be achieved unless this trend was reversed. Congress fur-
ther recognized that this would not be possible unless blacks were able to
action goals as a remedy for identified past discrimination). Although Weber is used chiefly by the
courts of appeals in title VII cases, most courts recognize that Weber should be considered in light of
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), although Fullilove passed on the constitutionality of a
public, affirmative race-conscious plan. Whether considering only Weber and title VII, or the equal
protection issue, no court of appeals has felt free to disregard Bakke's bar of a rigid race-conscious
quota. While not all courts of appeals treated the relation between the title VII and equal protection
standards for affirmative action goals in precisely the same way, a consensus developed that a Bakke-
Weber-Fullilove formula exists that should be applied to test the validity of race- or sex-conscious
affirmative action goals, barring some new specific interpretation of title VII. See infra text accom-
panying notes 138-141. See, eg., Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en
banc); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981); Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. City of
Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980), affd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d
435 (5th Cir. 1981). In Williams, the controlling opinion dared refer to Weber and Fullilove as "the
two leading Title VII quota cases." 729 F.2d at 1560 (Williams, J.). See also, e.g., Janowiak v.
Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984),petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3016
(U.S. July 16, 1985) (No. 84-1936); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2357 (1985). Of course, in a purely constitutional (Le., equal protection) sense, the decisions
directly on point are Bakke and Fullilove. However, the widespread impression is that Fullilove
represents Bakke refined by the factors identified in Weber. Again, in a purely title VII sense, the
decision directly in point is Weber. Still, the courts of appeals have taken note of Fullilove, especially
where the affirmative action goals were not voluntarily adopted. The question considered here has
greater significance where governmental action is challenged; for in that case, both equal protection
and title VII are directly applicable. In this context, the Bakke-Weber-Fullilove consensus comes
into play.
61. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
62. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
63. Id. at 208.
64. Id. at 203 (quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey, who piloted the Civil Rights Act through




North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1985], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss2/2
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER STOTTS
secure jobs 'which have a future.' "67 Rejecting plaintiff's contention that
title VII contained an "absolute prohibition" against "race-conscious af-
firmative action efforts to hasten the elimination of such vestiges,' 68 the
Court said:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who
had been excluded from the American dream for so long ... constituted
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy.69
The Court did not suggest that every race-conscious plan was valid;
however, the plan in Weber satisfied the criteria for an affirmative action
plan to fall "on the permissible side of the line."7 The focus of the Kai-
ser plan was to remedy severe past racial discrimination at the plant and
"to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories." 7 Also, "[t]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the in-
terests of white employees." 72 Finally, the plan was temporary, with ra-
cially preferential selection concluding when "the percentage of black
skilled craft workers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage
of blacks in the local labor force."73
In the face of an angry dissent by Justice Rehnquist arguing that the
Court had misread Congress' intent,74 Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion reminded that "if the Court has misperceived the political will, it
has the assurance that because the question is statutory Congress may set
a different course if it chooses."75 Since Weber, the courts of appeals
often have applied the Weber criteria of permissibility beyond purely
"voluntary" affirmative action plans,76 and Congress has made no move
to undo the Weber result or its progeny. However, under the Reagan
Administration, the Department of Justice has moved strongly to elimi-
nate all affirmative action goals. 77 Such a design would, as the Adminis-
tration's proponents recognize, require no less than overruling Weber
itself.78
67. Id. at 202-03.
68. Id. at 204.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 208.
71. Id. at 209.
72. Id. The plan "does not require the discharge of white workers," nor does it "create an
absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; half of those trained in the program will be
white," and the plan was newly created. Id.
73. Id. at 209.
74. Id. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. See cases cited supra note 60.
77. See infra text accompanying note 106 and notes 208, 351, 396.
78. As early as December 1981, William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, tipped his hand by declaring
13
Broderick: Affirmative Action after Stotts: The United States Supreme Court'
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1985
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
2. The Courts of Appeals
Both before and after the Supreme Court first tackled the question of
the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action goals as a rem-
edy for past discrimination,79 and both before and after the Court made
its additional, although incomplete, contributions to the subject in later
decisions,80 each of the federal courts of appeals has agreed that race-
conscious affirmative action goals may be used, in appropriate cases, as a
remedy for past discrimination. The courts have decided that these goals
are available in addition to rendering specific relief to an individual who
has been a victim of proven discrimination."
As previously discussed,8" in a class action, one who establishes a right
to employment based on the proven discrimination of an employer also
must prove that he is a victim of such discrimination. Franks83 and
Teamsters84 plainly required this and, therefore, the point is not of much
interest. Of considerable interest is the way that the courts of appeals,
without guidance from the Supreme Court (other than occasional denials
of certiorari), have unanimously decided that once discrimination against
blacks as a class has been proven, title VII and equal protection permit
race-conscious goals to be used as remedies." These goals may benefit
not just "an individual black as an individual, but . . . blacks as
blacks."86 As one federal judge who has served throughout the entire
period observed: "Thus, when faced with our society's systemic racial
discrimination against blacks as a class, an effective remedy must be
color conscious.
87
that Weber was "wrongly decided." Preferred Hiring of Women and Minorities Faces A U.S. Chal-
lenge, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
79. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
80. Fullilove v, Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979).
81. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 825 (1 lth Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed 54 U.S.L.W. 3149
(U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 84-1936); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 499 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. City of
Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614
F.2d 1358, 1363-66 (5th Cir. 1980); Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 364 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d
918, 944 (10th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-77 (3d Cir. 1977);
Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1974),
cerL denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
No. 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970).
82. See supra text accompanying note 42.
83. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See supra note 42.
84. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); see supra note 42.
85. See supra note 81.
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The cases before the courts of appeals have included private discrimi-
nation under title VII,88 discrimination by governmental bodies under
title VII89 and equal protection,90 and the use of legal affirmative action
plans by employers, either private or governmental, to rebut a plaintiff's
claim of invidious discrimination under title VII.9 1 The cases are endless
and citations only serve to indicate the participation of all the circuit
courts in the consensus.92 In some of these cases, the affirmative action
goals have been upheld,93 while in others the goals have been set aside as
excessive.94 Some circuits have been more reluctant than others to ap-
88. See, e.g., Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1064 (1981); Lehman v. Yellow Freight, Inc. 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981); Parker v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981);.
89. Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); Palmer v. District Bd. of Trustees of St.
Petersburg Junior College, 748 F.2d 595 (11th Cir. 1984); Janowiak v. Corporate City of South
Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), petition for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. July 16, 1985)
(No. 84-1936); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S.
Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 782
(1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); Wil-
liams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Bratton v. City of Detroit,
704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); LaRiviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Association Against
Discrim. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Miami, 614
F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980), affid in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 435 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
90. Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (1984), petition for cerL filed 54
U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. July 16, 1985) (No. 84-1936); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152
(1984), cerL granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (1984), cerL
denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981);
United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980), affd in part and remanded in part on
other grounds, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608
F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
91. Palmer v. District Bd. of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior College, 748 F.2d 595 (11th Cir.
1984); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981);
LaRiviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. See supra note 81.
93. Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); EEOC v. Local 638,
753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cert granted sub nom. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Palmer v. District Bd. of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior College, 748 F.2d
595 (11th Cir. 1984); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
703 (1984); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981);
LaRiviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322
(5th Cir. 1980), affid in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
bane); Association Against Discrim. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981).
94. See, eg., EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Local 28
of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); Janowiak v. Corporate City
of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3016 (July 16, 1985)
(No. 84-1936); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Lehman v.
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d
15
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prove race-conscious affirmative action goals. 95
This entire development rested on the premise that Franks96 and
Teamsters9 7 (with their "specific victim" requirement) did not restrict the
grant of prospective affirmative goal relief.98 Williams v. City of New
Orleans99 was perhaps the first case in which a court of appeals seriously
considered (and rejected) the argument that title VII affirmative race-
conscious relief was limited to identified "victims."
The divergent views of affirmative action goals collided before the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams just months 1" before the
Stotts1"' decision. Black police officers, charging racial discrimination in
promotions in the police department, brought a title VII action. The
proposed settlement decree provided that whenever a supervisory posi-
tion became available, one black officer would be promoted for every
white officer promoted until blacks constituted fifty percent of all the
ranks within the New Orleans Police Department. The district court,
after a "fairness hearing," declined to approve this promotion provision
although other aspects of the decree were approved. When a panel of the
court of appeals ruled that the district court had abused its discretion,
the United States was granted permission to intervene. The United
States filed a suggestion for rehearing en banc by the Fifth Circuit. The
court of appeals ruled seven to six that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting that affirmative goal provision; however, nine of
the thirteen judges agreed that "the use of quotas or goals under Title
VII without regard to specific victims as one means to remedy past dis-
crimination has been upheld regularly throughout the federal courts of
appeals."'1
0 2
The majority rejecting the promotion goals consisted of differing
1322 (5th Cir. 1980), afl'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 435 (1981) (en
banc); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
95. Among the most reluctant are the Fourth Circuit, see Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585
F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979), the Second Circuit, see EEOC v. Local
638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cerL granted sub nom. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985) and Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d
420, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (racial quotas are appropriate only where "a clear-cut pattern
of long-continued and egregious discrimination" is found and the reverse discriminatory effects are
not felt by "a small number of readily identifiable individuals"), and the D.C. Circuit, see Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
96. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
97. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See supra note 42.
98. See supra note 44.
99. 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc).
100. Williams was decided on April 23, 1984. Stotts was argued before the United States
Supreme Court on December 6, 1983, but was not decided until July 12, 1984.
101. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
102. Williams, 729 F.2d at 1557.
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views. Three of the judges read Bakke- Weber-Fullilove10 3 so strictly as to
bar any approval of race-conscious promotion goals here. Two judges
found a constitutional bar to "the imposition of a [consent] decree that
requires a unit of state government to discriminate on the basis of race
without reference to whether those favored have ever been the victims of
discrimination or those injured have either practiced or benefited from
it."1" Two other judges, Williams and Clark, expressly rejected the po-
sition advocated by the Assistant Attorney General, William Bradford
Reynolds, on behalf of the United States that "§ 703(g) of Title VII pros-
cribes the use of any remedy which is not limited to actual victims of past
discrimination."' 5 However, they concluded that the district judge had
not abused his discretion when that court failed to approve the race-con-
scious promotion goals in the consent decree because he had been within
the bounds of the Bakke- Weber-Fullilove standards.1 0 6 These seven
judges constituted the majority of the court which affirmed the district
judge's rejection of the race-conscious promotion goals provision of the
proposed settlement; however, no one among the majority endorsed the
United States' proposition that no race-conscious goals, whether or not
responsive to proven past discrimination, can ever constitutionally in-
clude non-victims.
In a dissenting opinion for six judges, Judge Wisdom10 7 confronted the
United States' position squarely, stating that the district court was not
only authorized but required by the Bakke-Weber-Fulllove analysis to
approve the consent decree.'0 Judge Wisdom found no obstacle in title
VII to recognizing the promotion goals as "appropriate" race-conscious
relief. He read Bakke-Fullilove as requiring a standard of review less
than that of strict scrutiny to uphold remedial race-conscious affirmative
goals. 109 Further, he argued that the present plan survived even the
strict scrutiny test of a compelling governmental interest and closely tai-
lored standard of review:
First, the state has a compelling interest in curing the effects of past racial
discrimination in the workplace and in insuring an integrated work
force .... This interest focuses on group representation in employment
and is distinct from that focused on the individual's right to be free from
discrimination. . . . Thus, the state's interest cannot be served ade-
quately by a remedy that addresses only the rights of identifiable
103. See supra note 60.
104. Williams, 729 F.2d at 1565 (Gee and Garwood, J.J., specially concurring).
105. Id. at 1557 (Williams and Clark, J.J.).
106. See supra notes 60, 81 and infra note 153.
107. Judge Wisdom is a jurist veteran of the major civil rights decisions of the Fifth Circuit in
the 1960's and 1970's. See J. BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES 42-55 (1982).
108. Williams, 729 F.2d at 1584 (Wisdom, J. concurring).
109. See supra notes 60, 81 and infra text accompanying note 153.
17
Broderick: Affirmative Action after Stotts: The United States Supreme Court'
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1985
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
victims.
110
This dissenting opinion sharply draws the lines of conflict between the
United States' "identifiable victim" approach and the race-conscious af-
firmative goal remedy allowed, with varying degrees, in all the courts of
appeals. Judge Wisdom rejects the United States' contention that "pro-
spective race-conscious steps by government employers is proscribed by
either Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."11' The opinion further argues that "[w]holly aside from
the fourteenth amendment, the thirteenth amendment is an affirmative
grant of power to eliminate slavery along with its 'badges and incidents'
and to establish universal civil freedom."' 1 2 Judge Wisdom contends
that affirmative action under title VII should be construed in this thir-
teenth amendment context.
1 13
3. The Problem of Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts114
Judicial acceptance of affirmative action goals reached a new stage
when two courts of appeals enjoined the discharge of minority workers
who had been hired pursuant to a court-approved affirmative action plan,
despite protests by majority workers claiming protection of seniority sys-
tems with "last-hired first fired" provisions. The first of these cases, Bos-
ton Firefighters,"5 briefed and argued in the Supreme Court in the spring
of 1983, was dismissed as moot when the majority seniors were re-
hired.116 However, the Supreme Court immediately granted certiorari in
the second of these cases, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
11 7
and later decided in favor of the majority seniors in the closing days of
the 1984 Term.11
In Stotts, the court of appeals had upheld an injunction against the
discharge of black firemen who had been hired under an affirmative ac-
tion plan embodied in a consent decree as a remedy against past racial
discrimination in hiring practices by the Memphis Fire Department. 19
Justice White, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, identified
the issue "at the heart of this case" as "whether the district court ex-
110. Williams, 729 F.2d at 1575 (Wisdom, J. dissenting). He calls the "identifiable victim" ap-
proach "the Attorney General's shibboleth." Id. at 1576. See infra text accompanying notes 138-69
(further discussion of constitutional standard).
111. Id at 1577.
112. Id
113. Id at 1578.
114. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
115. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, 679 F.2d 965 (lst Cir.
1982).
116. 461 U.S. 477, 479 (1983).
117. 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983), granting cerL to Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1982).
118. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
119. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982).
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ceeded its powers in entering an injunction requiring white employees to
be laid off, when the otherwise applicable seniority system would have
called for the layoff of black employees with less seniority." ' The
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that whether
the injunction order be viewed as a construction of the consent decree or
as a function of the court's inherent authority to modify the decree be-
cause of changed circumstances, the district court had exceeded its
authority.
Viewing Stotts as a pure title VII seniority case, the Court's decision
was straightforward. Interpreting section 703(h) 1 2 1 as protecting bona
fide seniority systems, the Court long has ruled that only an identified
individual victim of post-Civil Rights Act discrimination would be al-
lowed to receive a remedial promotion over an employee whose seniority
rights had been established by a bona fide (Le., non-discriminatory) sen-
iority system. 122 In the "construction" of the consent decree, the major-
ity found no basis for implying that the affirmative action remedy
established by the decree should abridge the protection afforded by sec-
tion 703(h) to bona fide seniority rights "absent some express provision
to that effect" 121 in the consent decree. The consent decree remained
silent on that point.
The Supreme Court rejected the conclusion of the court of appeals that
the district court had "inherent authority" to modify the consent decree
because the minority layoffs would undermine the affirmative action re-
lief to which the adversary parties had agreed in reaching the "settle-
ment." Justice White restated that the question of layoffs had not been
settled in the decree. Then he considered the court of appeals "inherent
authority" argument: if the case had been tried and discrimination
found, the district court, as an element of its power to grant an "appro-
priate," "make whole" remedy, could have overridden the seniority sys-
tem. Justice White flatly denied the district court's authority to
disregard a seniority system protected by section 703(h) when fashioning
a remedy in a title VII decree. Such denial can be viewed as merely an
extension to the affirmative action context of the strong reading given
section 703(h) in Teamsters: 24 only if "individual members of a plaintiff
class demonstrate that they have been actual victims of the discrimina-
tory practice" can they "be awarded competitive seniority and given
their rightful place on the seniority roster."' 2  Under Teamsters, mere
membership in the class is insufficient for this seniority, "rightful place"
120. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2585.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
122. See supra notes 42, 44.
123. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
124. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); see supra note 42.
125. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
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relief.126 Because "[h]ere, there was no finding that any of the blacks
protected from layoff had been a victim of discrimination," "no award of
competitive seniority to any of them" could be given. 27
Had the Court stopped here, Stotts could be recognized fully with a
footnote reference because the case would stand for the unremarkable
proposition that Teamsters covered this situation, or at most, that abridg-
ing such seniority rights would "unnecessarily trammel" the interests of
majority employees in violation of Weber. However, the White opinion
went beyond holding that the Teamsters rule would forestall a district
court from awarding individual "super-seniority" relief to one not identi-
fied as a victim of proven discrimination by a suggestion with totally
unexpected implications: that under section 706(g),128 the remedy sec-
tion of the Act, "[n]ot even a Court, much less the [City] Commission,
could order racial quotas or the hiring, reinstatement, admission to mem-
bership or payment of back pay for anyone who is not discriminated
against in violation of this title [VII]." 129 In his dissent, Justice Black-
mun proposed that the majority was undermining the carefully crafted
remedy of group relief under title VII in which every court of appeals
had previously concurred,13 as well as Justice White himself 1 ' and a
majority of the Supreme Court in the trilogy of Bakke- Weber-
Fullilove.
132
The White opinion failed to answer the question "[w]hether the City, a
public employer, could have taken this course without violating the
law," 133 nor did the majority speak against Weber's qualified green light
for "voluntary" affirmative action plans. Furthermore, in emphasizing
the legislative reminder in the 1972 amendment of title VII that section
706(g) was directed to "making whole insofar as possible the victims of
racial discrimination,"'34 Justice White suggested no rigid limits on the
amount of discrimination needed to identify an employee as a "victim"
for the purpose of affirmative goal relief.
The immediate target in Stotts was a bitterly opposed injunction, not
the "settlement" capacity of a consent decree as a "voluntary" (even if
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
129. Id. at 2590. This passage comes from a "bi-partisan news letter delivered during an at-
tempted filibuster to each senator supporting the bill .... " and appears to be accepted by the opin-
ion. Id. at 2589-90.
130. See supra note 44.
131. Justice White joined the Brennan Four opinion in Bakke. See supra note 44 and infra note
143.
132. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion. Id.
133. Id. at 2560.
134. Id. n.15.
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judicially reinforced) instrument. The injunction exceeded judicial limits
in the view of the Court.
Some courts of appeals have read Stotts as a "seniority system" case,135
declining to see cause to change their previous interpretations of the
Bakke- Weber-Fullilove "formula." 136  Others have taken seriously the
threat to the continued viability of affirmative action goals posed by Jus-
tice White's dicta.
137
B. Constitutional Considerations: Equal Protection
While the Supreme Court's guidance to the lower courts respecting
affirmative action and title VII has been fragmentary, the Court's gui-
dance as to equal protection has been enigmatic. The federal courts of
appeals, therefore, have struggled in the face of, what must seem, almost
a deliberate obfuscation. Nevertheless, the courts of appeals have agreed
without exception that the Supreme Court has given a constitutional
"green light"1 38 to the use of race as a factor in governmental decision-
making. This includes the reasonable remedial use of race (and sex) in
legislative, executive, or administrative action, in a judicial decree, or in
an affirmative action plan of a public entity. Meanwhile, the courts of
appeals have edged towards a consensus on the constitutional standards
by which the Supreme Court expects them to test the validity of affirma-
tive action. Such standards include the use of race or sex goals to remedy
the effects of past identified discrimination.
1 39
In 1976, the Supreme Court, after full briefing and oral argument, de-
clined to face the question of preferential racial admission to law schools
because the question became moot with the white plaintiff's completion
135. See discussion of 1985 docket cases infra at pp. 168-85.
136. Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n ofFirefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); EEOC v. Local 638,
753 F.2d 1172 (2d. Cir.), cerL granted sub nom. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); Van Aken v. Young, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984); Palmer v. District Bd.
of Trustess of St. Petersburg Junior College, 748 F.2d 595 (11th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency, 748 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th
Cir. 1984), cerL granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.
1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
137. See discussion of 1985 docket cases infra at pp. 169-85.
138. This "green light" exists within the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
with respect to states, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and within the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment due process clause as it relates to the federal
government, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
139. See supra note 60 (Bakke-Weber-Fullilove criteria). Several courts of appeals hold sex- and
race-conscious goals equally applicable to equal protection and to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The development of this test in the Supreme Court is discussed only briefly here. For fuller
treatment, see Broderick, Bakke, Weber and Mr. Justice Stewart: Constitutional Theory and Affirm-
ative Action, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 3, 46-68 (1979) and Broderick, The Nature of the Constitutional
Proces" Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 320, 331-39, 352-53, 378-92
(1981).
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of the course."4 However, in 1978, in the heralded Bakke14 ' case, a di-
vided Supreme Court established two equal protection propositions: (1) a
rigid racial quota denied equal protection rights of the excluded white
plaintiff;42 and (2) race might be used as one factor in admission stan-
dards of a public university, although such use of race might disadvan-
tage another unsuccessful applicant. 143
In 1980, the Court again considered the use of race as a criterion for
participation in a valuable public benefit in a completely different con-
text. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,' 4 the Court faced the question of the
constitutionality of federal legislation which set aside up to ten percent of
the $4,200,000,000 appropriation of the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977145 for qualified "minority business enterprises." The affirmative
action promoted by the statute was challenged by white contractors who
argued that Congress could not attach conditions to the exercise of its
spending power if such conditions violate the equal protection compo-
nent of the fifth amendment,146 and that the explicit racial and ethnic
criteria used in the statute violated their rights as identified in Bakke. 47
The Court, in two three-Justices opinions, disagreed. Congress designed
the legislation to remedy past discrimination in the building trades, a
140. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
141. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
142. This is universally accepted as a "constitutional" conclusion of Bakke, although only the
opinion of Justice Powell reached such conclusion. Four other Justices concluded that defendant
Bakke's rights had been violated by a public medical school's admission plan that reserved 16 of 100
seats for blacks and other minorities, but they reached their conclusion on the basis of title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, avoiding the constitutional question. Any doubts that Bakke constituted a
"constitutional" conclusion were removed by Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (discussed
infra at pp. 166-67).
143. This "one factor" specification appears only in the Bakke opinion of Justice Powell. The
four other Justices who comprised the majority on the proposition (Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall
and White) offered a much less rigorous test for approval of affirmative action plans, so much so that
they would not have admitted Bakke to the medical school. Their four votes, however, combined
with Justice Powell to establish a somewhat indeterminate constitutional position (the broadest that
Justice Powell would accept): "the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by
a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (Powell, J.).
In his solo opinion, Justice Powell seemed to identify the rigorous compelling state interest test as
applicable to what he called racial discrimination against Bakke. Id. at 299. He then found that
race, as one factor, could be compelling in the university setting. Id. Some courts have seen the
compelling state interest test as controlling in affirmative action cases, citing the Powell opinion in
Bakke. However, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Supreme Court specified that the plan under attack
passed muster under the Bakke opinions of either Justice Powell or the Brennan Four. 448 U.S. 492.
Also in Fullilove, Justice Powell considerably softened his own constitutional requirements for af-
firmative action goals. Id. at 448, 508, 510.
144. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1982).
146. See supra notes 8, 138.
147. The opinion of Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and White concurring, stressed the
federal constitutional power of Congress and found no constitutional obstacle from equal protection.
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Brennan adhered to their position in Bakke. See supra note 143.
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purpose the Court found adequately identified in the legislative his-
tory.148 The quota was not rigid but was instead a flexible allotment
made only to those qualified minority contractors who had in fact suf-
fered from effects of prior discrimination. The preference was not avail-
able to "minority firms whose access [was] not impaired" by the
identified discrimination. 49 In this context, the minority preference was
"equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimi-
nation." '5 The Court further noted in Fullilove that the burden on
"non-minority firms is relatively light." 5 '
Considering the Supreme Court's rather rigid Bakke formulation in
light of Fullilove, many courts of appeals concluded that Fullilove had
adapted the three-prong Weber test for title VIII5 2 to set the constitu-
tional equal protection limits of affirmative action. 153 First, the congres-
sional set-aside program in Fulliove did not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white"1 54 contractors. Second, the program was, indeed,
temporary (i.e., limited to the allocation of the funds appropriated under
the program). Third, the program was "designed to eliminate conspicu-
ous racial imbalance [discrimination] in traditionally segregated [busi-
ness] categories." 5 However, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Fullilove
contained two caveats: (1) the set-aside program in Fullilove pressed the
"outer limits of congressional authority," 156 and (2) the remedial author-
ity of Congress was broader than that of a federal court.157 The Burger
opinion reiterated the Powell position in Bakke which insisted that af-
firmative action goals would be justified ordinarily only as a remedy for
past discrimination and that authoritative official findings of this discrim-
ination are required. The program in Fullilove satisfied this last require-
ment, although no formal findings were made because Congress had
access to evidence from which to reasonably conclude "that traditional
procurement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could per-
petuate the effects of prior discrimination." ' A hint of the "victim"
analysis which surfaced in Stotts159 in a title VII setting can be found in
148. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
149. Id. at 482.
150. Id. at 483.
151. Id. at 484.
152. See supra note 60.
153. The Court expressly disclaimed Weber as dealing with a constitutional requirement or that
the Court was prescribing limits of affirmative action. Weber, 443 U.S. at 228; see supra text accom-
panying notes 57-60.
154. Cf. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 484; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
155. Cf. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 478; Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
156. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490.
157. Id. at 483.
158. Id. at 478.
159. Compare supra text accompanying note 134 with supra note 42 and accompanying text. See
supra note 44.
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Fullilove. 1' The set-aside program in Fullilove was saved by its "flexibil-
ity." Minority members who had not been disadvantaged by the racial
discrimination which the affirmative action set-aside program was
designed to remedy were not benefited.' 61
Two questions arise in the context of the interrelation of title VII and
equal protection analysis as to the legality and constitutionality of reme-
dial racial (or sexual) affirmative action goals. First: Is any such pro-
gram which survives title VII likely to run afoul of equal protection?
The majority of the courts of appeals which have considered the question
have said, "No."' 62 In view of Fullilove, this would appear to be correct,
barring retreat by the Supreme Court. Second: Is the Weber test' the
practical measure of equal protection in those cases in which remedial
affirmative action (i.e., racial/sexual goals) is not subject to title VII stan-
dards because they are not relating to employment conditions? A major-
ity of the courts of appeals which have considered this question have
held, "Yes,"'" some stating explicitly that the test for all practical pur-
poses is the same for equal protection and title VII.65 Given findings of
"identified past discrimination," temporariness, and plans that do "no
unnecessarily trammelling" of competitors, the federal courts following
Weber,16 6 and Fullilove,167 and and even Stotts,1 68 almost uniformly con-
clude that a remedial race- or sex-specific affirmative action plan passes
both the title VII and equal protection tests.
1 69
160. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448, U.S. 448, 488 (1979). But Chief Justice Burger noted that
Congress concluded that specified "groups" were "victims of discrimination." Id.
161. Consider the distinction between (1) minority persons shown not to have been disadvan-
taged by the identified past discrimination, (2) minority persons who are arguably disadvantaged as
members of the group discriminated against, and (3) individual minority persons shown to be spe-
cific victims of the past discrimination in the sense that they did not get particular contracts (or jobs)
because of their race. Fullilove suggests that the approved set-aside plan bars (1), yet admits both (2)
and (3). See supra text accompanying note 129 as to whether Justice White's opinion in Stotts in-
tends to follow Fullilove on this or is staking out new ground by limiting affirmative action goals to
the Franks-Teamsters "specific victims" situation, see supra note 42.
162. See Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782
(1985); Boston Chaper, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct.
2154, 2155 (1985); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 454
U.S. 1064 (1981). But see Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 703 (1984); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 938 (1981); Note, NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n-The Demarcation of Title VII
and the Fourteenth Amendment in Employment Discrimination, 15 N.C. CENT. L.J. 295 (1985).
163. See supra note 60.
164. See Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985);
Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
165. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (Ist Cir. 1982).
166. Fullilove f. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979).
167. See cases cited supra note 93.
168. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
169. For pre-Stotts cases, see Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en
24
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1985], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss2/2
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER STOTTS
II. THE 1985 DOCKET CASES
The stage is set for considering the six affirmative action cases on the
Supreme Court's 1985 docket: first, the case already argued-Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education;17 next, the two cases for which certiorari
has been granted-Vanguards v. City of Cleveland 71 and EEOC v. Local
638;172 and finally, the three cases in which certiorari petitions are still
pending'73-Marsh v. Board of Education,1 74 Turner v. Orr,175 and Ja-
nowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend.17 6 Each of these cases illumi-
nates some aspect of the status of affirmative action goals after Stotts.
177
A. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
178
The first affirmative action case which the Supreme Court agreed to
hear this Term, Wygant, derives from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the same court of appeals which heard Stotts.1 79 Over the years, this
circuit court has given the broadest interpretation to Supreme Court de-
cisions on permissible affirmative action goals.s°
In Wygant, the district court, on summary judgment, denied the re-
quest of plaintiff, a white school teacher,18' to enjoin enforcement of a
provision of a collective bargaining agreement existing between the de-
fendants, the Jackson Board of Education and the teachers union. The
provision provided, in effect, that the board could lay off no greater per-
centage of minority teachers than the percentage of the minority student
bane) and United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980), affid in part and remanded
in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981). For post-Stotts cases, see Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v.
School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985) and Segar v. Smith,
738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
170. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
171. 753 F.2d 817 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters
v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
172. 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cert granted sub nor. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985).
173. Any or none of these latter petitions may be granted. In the event of the Court's agreeing to
hear any of these cases, the Court could direct they be heard jointly or separately in either this or the
1986 Term.
174. 581 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'dmemr, 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985),petition for
cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1859).
175. 759 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985), petition for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Sept. 10,
1985) (No. 85-177).
176. 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3016 (July 16, 1985) (No.
84-1936).
177. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
178. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
179. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982).
180. See id.; Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 703
(1984); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 452 U.S.
938 (1981).
181. Wygant was the representative plaintiff in a class action.
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population.182 Plaintiff's action was based on both title VII and equal
protection grounds. The court of appeals affirmed the district court on
the title VII claim. 183 Stotts did not apply because the plan included a
"voluntary," rather than a court-ordered protective layoff provision;
however, the layoff plan satisfied the applicable Weber test. The court
said "substantial and chronic"' 84 discrimination was found by a compe-
tent body and the layoff plan constituted a "reasonable" remedy to cure
the identified discrimination. 185 Two chief concerns seem to underly the
grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. First, Wygant raises a question
which the Court expressly left open in Stotts: whether an explicit minor-
ity layoff provision in a governmental collective bargaining agreement
could override seniority rights otherwise protected by section 703(h). t86
Second, Wygant raises the question of whether adequate evidence of
"conspicuous racial imbalance" existed to justify the layoff provision,
even in a voluntary context. In pattern and practice cases under title VII
that rely largely on statistical proof of discrimination, the Supreme Court
has rejected the use of a statistical disproportion between minority teach-
ers and the minority student body. The Court instead has required a
comparison of minority teachers in the particular school district charged
with discrimination with the total minority population in the relevant
geographical area. 187 The Court has yet to require the same statistical
rigidity in title VII cases claiming to demonstrate "conspicuous racial
imbalance." However, the Court may wish to consider whether an ade-
quate showing has been made here to justify the Jackson Board's findings
182. The challenged collective bargaining provisions determined that seniority ordinarily would
govern layoffs "except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." Wygant, 746
F.2d at 1154. Because the percentage of minority personnel employed was in turn keyed to the
minority student percentage in an individual school, layoffs were not to reduce the percentage of
minority teachers below that of minority student population.
183. Since it upheld the affirmative action provision under title VII, the Court did not feel the
need to consider equal protection (standards of which were equivalent in the Sixth Circuit to title
VII). Compare discussion of the Bakke-Weber-Fullilove factors supra note 60.
184. This term comes from Brennan's dissenting opinion in Bakke, in which only four Justices
joined. See supra note 143. Curiously, the Sixth Circuit has used the Brennan opinion, rather than
that of Justice Powell, as the measure of permissible affirmative action, perhaps deriving increasing
confidence from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young,
608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981), and Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704
F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984). Although the use of a standard that did
not command a court majority is troublesome (le., "substantial and chronic"), the much-cited
Bakke opinion of Justice Powell similarly used a troublesome standard. With Justice Powell remov-
ing some of the rigidity from his Bakke approach in Fullilove, see supra text accompanying note 150,
and the substantial acceptance of the Weber factors in Fullilove, the so-called Bakke- Weber-Fulliove
formula is hardly distinguishable from the approach of the Brennan Four in Bakke.
185. Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1156.
186. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). "Whether the City, a
public employer, could have taken this course [of unilaterally adopting the layoff priority over sen-
iority] is an issue we need not decide [since] the City took no such action." Id. at 2590.
187. Hazlewood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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of "substantial underrepresentation" of minorities on the faculty.88 to
justify a measure as strong as the protective race-conscious layoff provi-
sion, particularly in light of the conceded fact that the provision cost the
plaintiff her job.
In Wygant, the Supreme Court may focus further on the traditionally
"soft" approach of the Sixth Circuit to equal protection analysis. While
appearing to substantially equate the title VII and equal protection tests
in the same manner as some other circuits, the Sixth Circuit's analysis of
Bakke has been rooted not in the Powell opinion which is generally re-
garded as controlling, but in the Brennan opinion which never has com-
manded a majority of the Court. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
the leading sixth circuit cases of Young189 and Bratton19 ° in which this
approach was developed. Although an affirmative action plan which sur-
vives a proper Weber analysis as suggested above,191 should survive the
Bakke-Fullilove analysis on equal protection grounds, perhaps the four192
Justices voting for certiorari in Wygant thought the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals had misinterpreted the Young and Bratton certiorari denials;
therefore, granting certiorari to align the Sixth Circuit cases with the
Bakke-Fullilove equal protection analysis of the other circuits and of the
Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court could reverse Wygant on any
of these grounds, and leave the status of affirmative action goals intact.
The Supreme Court has several alternatives in deciding Wygant, as the
case raises both equal protection and title VII considerations.1 93 For the
Supreme Court to affirm Wygant on title VII grounds, the Court would
have to conclude that section 703(h), 194 title VII's seniority protection
provision, did not apply to a voluntarily adopted protective layoff provi-
sion (as distinguished from an injunction). 195 Further, the Court would
have to conclude that in the special circumstances of a school setting, the
188. Before 1953, no black teachers were employed in the Jackson City Schools. By 1969 black
students totalled 15.2% of the school population, while only 3.9% of the school teaching staff con-
sisted of blacks. By November 1971, blacks constituted 15.9% of the student population and 8.3-
8.5% of the faculty. Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1156.
189. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
938 (1981).
190. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 144-61.
192. Four Justices' votes are needed to grant a petition for certiorari. More than four may, of
course, vote to grant a petition, but no public record is made of these votes. Once a petition for
certiorari has been granted, the Court ordinarily sets the case for briefing and oral argument. How-
ever, the Court has stressed that no substantive legal conclusion is to be drawn from the denial of
certiorari beyond the fact that the end of appellate review has been reached in that case.
193. Two key questions concerning affirmative action goals are not directly raised by Wygant:
(1) whether or not a consent decree may be viewed as "voluntary" for purposes of title VII; and (2)
whether or not a court may order affirmative action goals as a remedy for past discrimination. I
shall return to these issues in discussing the other cases on the 1985 docket. See infra pp. 181-85.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
195. See supra text accompanying note 186.
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criteria of Weber19 6 had been satisfied. This would include a determina-
tion that the racial make-up of the teacher/student body ratio was an
adequate measure of past discrimination. Such requirement is necessi-
tated by Weber's requirement of "conspicuous racial imbalance in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories." '197 Such a decision also would entail
a conclusion that, even apart from section 703(h), the layoff provision in
Wygant did not constitute such a burden as to "unnecessarily trammel"
the interests of white teachers. An affirmance would require the determi-
nation that the burden, on its face, was sufficiently insubstantial to war-
rant the district court's disposition of Wygant's claim by summary
judgment.
If the Supreme Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit's disposition of Wy-
gant under title VII, theoretically, the Court still could reverse the case
on equal protection grounds. However many misgivings the Court may
have concerning the Sixth Circuit's formulation of equal protection stan-
dards in an affirmative action context in applying the Young-Bratton1 98
analysis, the Court would be hard-pressed to find an independent consti-
tutional basis for reversal 99 in view of Bakke-Weber-Fullilove.2°
The Supreme Court could, of course, reverse on the title VII claim by
extending protection of the seniority provision under title VII section
703(h) to voluntary racial layoff plans. However, if reversing, the Court
is more likely to rule that the Jackson plan did not meet the Weber test
either because (1) the possibility of "unnecessarily trammeling"20 the
interests of white teachers was too substantial to allow a summary judg-
ment or (2) the teacher/student body ratio was too tenuous a predicate of
past discrimination to establish the "conspicuous racial imbalance in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories."2 02 The Court has yet to apply the
same rigor to defensive justifications of an affirmative action plan as to a
plaintiff's establishment of a pattern of discrimination in a title VII com-
plaint.2 0 3 However, disfavor for teacher/student ratios, as distinguished
196. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1978).
197. Id. at 209. This would mean that the statistical rigors of Hazlewood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), see supra text accompanying note 187, would not be insisted upon in
establishing past discrimination under Weber.
198. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
199. In fact, the Sixth Circuit cases argue that the task of a governmental employer in justifying
affirmative action goals is, in one sense, easier under the equal protection clause than under title VII.
The argument is that once the constitutional violation of intentional racial discrimination is estab-
lished, the state (or local governmental body) has the affirmative constitutional obligation to remedy
the discrimination, citing the school desegregation cases, which Chief Justice Burger expanded in
Fullilove: "Where federal anti-discrimination laws have been violated, an equitable remedy may in
the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic factor." 448 U.S. at 483. This may include affirmative
race-conscious goals that are otherwise "appropriate."
200. See supra note 60.
201. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
202. Id. at 209.
203. See supra note 188.
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from work force/relevant labor market ratios such as those found in
Weber, to establish racial discrimination was made so manifest in Hazle-
wood"° that the Court could use this ground to justify a reversal in
Wygant.
The objective of the United States, as amicus curiae in Wygant, un-
doubtedly will be larger game than the narrow frameworks for reversal
suggested in the above discussion. Nothing less than the Court's repudia-
tion of Weber, and all affirmative action goals, will satisfy the Depart-
ment of Justice."°5 Wygant would seem a strange case for the Court to
select for such an outcome. In fact, the Court's decision on the first day
of the 1985 Term to grant certiorari in two other cases206 seems hinged to
its desire to confront directly this larger issue that first surfaced in
Stotts.20 7
B. EEOC v. Local 638208
In 1972, the Department of Justice20 9 brought a title VII action against
Union Local 638, alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination
against racial minorities with respect to admission to membership in the
union. In 1975, the district court found purposeful discrimination
against blacks and established a goal of twenty-nine percent minority
membership to be reached by 1981. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals approved the plan as a reasonable remedy under Bakke-Weber-
Fullilove.210
In 1982, the EEOC sought to have the union held in contempt for
violation of the decree. The EEOC alleged that the union had violated
various provisions of the 1975 court decree that had been devised as a
means of achieving the 29% goal. By 1982, the union had reached only
10.8% minority membership. The EEOC did not seek contempt on that
specific ground. Instead, the Commission cited the "collective effect of
204. Hazlewood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
205. See supra note 78 and infra text accompanying note 286. The Department of Justice, heart-
ened by Stotts, is reasserting its Franks-Teamsters "specific victim" limitation to affirmative action
which it asserted in Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F. 2d 1554 (5th Cir.1984), see supra text accompa-
nying note 105, and Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
206. Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cerL granted sub nom. Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); EEOC v. Local 638,
753 F.2d 1172 (2d. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985).
207. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 115-38).
208. EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985).
209. Pursuant to the 1972 amendments to title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, § 4 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1982)). The EEOC
was substituted for the Department of Justice as plaintiff. Id. at 1175.
210. EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d 31, 33-36 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821,
829-33 (2d Cir. 1976). See supra note 60.
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violations" to thwart the achievement of the 29% goal as grounds for
contempt. The union made a cross-motion to terminate the goal and the
detailed plan which had been established by the court to help achieve
that goal. The district court found the union in contempt, imposed a fine
of $150,000, and denied the union's cross-motion to cancel the goal.
Subsequently, the district court amended the affirmative action plan to
provide that the goal should be achieved by 1987. The union appealed
the contempt decree and the denial of its cross-motion to terminate the
affirmative action goals to the court of appeals.2 t '
The court of appeals affirmed the district court on both grounds, citing
"egregious non-compliance" with the 1975 decree. The court stressed
that the affirmative action goals twice previously had been upheld by the
court of appeals. The court of appeals' previous affirmation of the dis-
trict court had been rooted in the appellate court's perception that court-
ordered affirmative action goals were valid as a remedy for significant
past racial discrimination under the controlling Supreme Court deci-
sions. The union argued that the Stotts decision should change that per-
spective and bar "all race-conscious relief except that benefitting specified
victims of past discrimination.
2 12
In affirming the district court, the court of appeals ruled that Stotts did
not affect this case. Unlike Stotts, an express judicial finding of an intent
by the union to discriminate had been made. Also, this case did not
intrude upon a bona fide seniority plan under section 703(h) as did Stotts.
Furthermore, the court of appeals ruled that the Supreme Court's discus-
sion in Stotts of section 703(g),2 13 the general title VII remedial section,
related only to the individualized "make whole" relief ordered by the
district court in Stotts; therefore, this discussion had no reference to the
"prospective relief like that ordered" by the district court in this case.214
In effect, the court of appeals declined to view Justice White's opinion in
Stotts as targeting all non-voluntary judicially formulated affirmative ac-
tion goals. Judge Winter, dissenting from the panel discussion, con-
cluded that the court's ruling in this case "is at odds with" Stotts, "which
rejected such a use of racial preference as a remedy to Title VII.12 1 5 Fur-
ther, said Judge Winter, such relief ran afoul of the constitutional barri-
ers cited by Judge Powell in Bakke.216
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has been one of the most re-
strained appeals courts in endorsing affirmative action goals. In Local
638, the Second Circuit rejected certain other race-conscious remedies
211. Local 638, 753 F.2d at 1176-78.
212. Id. at 1185.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (1982).
214. Local 638, 753 F.2d at 1186.
215. Id. at 1193-94.
216. Id. at 1194 (Winter, J., dissenting) (plan was "a strict racial quota").
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provided by the district court as an abuse of discretion.217 The court
restated its interpretation of the Bakke- Weber-Fullilove limits for affirma-
tive action goals as follows: (1) a "clear cut pattern of long continued
and egregious racial discrimination ' 218 must be present; (2) the burden of
affirmative action relief must not be "concentrated upon a relatively
small, ascertainable group of non-minority persons; ' 21 9 and, (3) the plan
must be "temporary," in the context of Weber-Fullilove, meaning that
the affirmative relief can extend "only until the effects of the past dis-
crimination have been eliminated.
220
Of the six cases on the 1985 docket, Local 638 raises most squarely the
question whether the Supreme Court intended Stotts to signal the end of
judicially promulgated affirmative action goals as a type of "prospective
relief' for proven past racial discrimination. The grant of certiorari in
this case gives affirmative action advocates cause for grave concern.
C. Vanguards v. City of Cleveland
2 21
In Vanguards, a union of white firefighters is appealing a consent de-
cree that includes race-conscious affirmative action goals approved by the
district court. Black and Hispanic firefighters, alleging a long history of
racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in the Cleveland
Fire Department, sued the City of Cleveland for violation of their title
VII and equal protection rights. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against
the continuation of such practices and the further remedy of affirmative
action hiring and promotion goals.
Before the case came to trial, plaintiffs and the defendant City entered
into settlement negotiations.222 After a proposed consent decree was
drafted by plaintiffs and Cleveland, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing in which the white union's objections to promotion goals were
heard. At the hearing, the union made no objection to the hiring goals.
The district court accepted the proposed consent decree which provided
for departmental examinations for the positions of lieutenant and above.
The consent decree further delayed the preferential treatment of qualified
minority applicants for promotion until certain specified goals were
reached.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that "[t]he docu-
ments, statistics and testimony at the hearings . . . reveal a historical
217. Id. at 1188.
218. Id. at 1186.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1187.
221. 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub. nom. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
222. Local 93, a union of white employees, was allowed to intervene in these negotiations. Id. at
481.
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pattern of racial discrimination in promotions." '223 The court of appeals
further agreed that the promotional goals established in the decree met
the Weber-Fullilove measure of "a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolu-
tion of the claims raised in this action." '224
After oral argument, but before the court of appeals made its decision,
the Supreme Court decided Stotts. 25 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
allowed supplemental briefs from the parties addressing the possible ef-
fect of Stotts on the outcome of Vanguards. However, the majority con-
cluded that Stotts did not affect this case, because the court viewed
Vanguards as involving a "voluntary" plan despite the embodiment of
the plan in a judicial decree. Although judicial in form, the court of
appeals identified the plan as essentially "voluntary" and, therefore, con-
trolled by Weber, which was left intact by the Stotts decision. The court
further concluded that in Stotts, where "the decree was essentially coer-
cive and consensual in name only," '226 the Supreme Court had not speci-
fied that voluntary settlement provisions could not exceed the limits that
a court might require in a coercive action. Accordingly, the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the district court had not "abused its dis-
cretion in approving the proposed consent decree.
227
In her dissent, Judge Kennedy disagreed with the majority on the im-
pact of Stotts, concluding that "the language and reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Stotts indicated that the consent decree in the present
case should be governed by the principles applicable to court-ordered
relief rather than those applicable to purely voluntary actions."2 Judge
Kennedy, while agreeing with the majority that the analysis of Weber
survived Stotts, disagreed that the consent decree was "voluntary" so as
to bring the case within the purview of Weber.2 29
The Supreme Court's avenue of decision here will not be as narrow as
in Wygant. Obviously, a reversal based on the analysis of Judge Ken-
nedy as to the "involuntariness" of a consent decree would have serious
implications for affirmative action goals without overruling Weber be-
cause without the practical availability of consent decrees, little incentive
would exist for parties to program affirmative action goals or to resolve
differences without a full trial.230 Still, Vanguards could be affirmed or
reversed without the Supreme Court's deciding the crucial "specific vic-
tim" issue; however, that issue hardly can be skirted in deciding the third
223. Id. at 485.
224. Id. at 484-85.
225. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
226. Vanguards, 753 F.2d at 489.
227. Id. at 485.
228. Id. at 489.
229. Id. at 491, 493.
230. See supra text accompanying note 28 and infra note 289.
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and final case in which the Court has granted certiorari-EEOC v. Local
638.231
Three other affirmative action petitions for certiorari remain on the
Supreme Court's 1985 docket, neither granted nor denied.232 The possi-
bility exists that the Court may take early action with respect to each.
More than likely, in light of the Court's past practice, these cases will
remain on the docket and be disposed of in light of the decisions which
the Court reaches in Wygant, Vanguards, and Local 638. These cases
bear discussion here to further illuminate the courts of appeals' interpre-
tation of the significance of Stotts.
D. Marsh v. Board of Education
2 33
Plaintiff, a white employee of the Flint Board of Education since 1965,
was promoted to the position of counselor in 1969. In a 1979-82 collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the Flint Board of Education and the
United Teachers of Flint, an affirmative action plan provided for the ra-
cial composition of the counselor and librarian staffs to be proportional
to the secondary teaching staff. The racial composition of the teaching
staff was to be proportional to the racial composition of the student body.
To maintain these proportions, plaintiff was dislodged from the coun-
selor position and was required to assume duties as a classroom teacher.
Simultaneously, four blacks with less seniority than plaintiff were re-
tained as counselors in that school year.
Marsh is an unusual case because the plaintiff challenged alleged racial
discrimination in government employment on equal protection grounds
in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,234 rather than under title
VII. The district judge, sympathetic to plaintiff's claim,23 felt foreclosed
from granting him relief by the express holdings of the Sixth Circuit in
Young236 and Bratton,237 two cases in which the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.238 The court of appeals affirmed the district court, apparently
231. EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nonm Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); see supra pp. 171-72.
232. See cases cited supra note 3.
233. 581 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd mem., 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985),petition for
cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1859).
234. Plaintiff also made claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1985(3) which are not relevant
here.
235. District Judge Newblatt's opinion is permeated with doubts of the soundness of prevailing
Sixth Circuit opinions on affirmative action goals, especially Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young,
608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981) and Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704
F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984). Marsh v. Board of Educ., 581 F. Supp.
614 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
236. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
938 (1981).
237. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984).
238. Marsh v. Board of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
33
Broderick: Affirmative Action after Stotts: The United States Supreme Court'
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1985
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
without opinion, and plaintiff petitioned for certiorari.239
The Supreme Court could grant certiorari in Marsh for the purpose of
reexamining Young and Bratton. Marsh raises the same question
presented in Wygant,24 i.e., whether the counselor/student ratio is an
adequate means of proving past discrimination.24 As noted above, re-
view by the Supreme Court would reach only equal protection and not
title VII considerations; therefore, this case is not directly related to
Stott.
2 4 2
E. Turner v. Orr
243
The most recent of the affirmative action petitions for certiorari filed
this Term, Turner is also the only such petition filed by the Department
of Justice. Here, as in other cases still in the lower federal courts, the
United States seeks to renounce a consent judgment to which the federal
government was a party. 2 "
Turner, a black civilian employee of the United States Air Force,
brought a class action on behalf of black civilian employees at the Eglin
Air Force Base in Florida, alleging racial discrimination in promotions.
Prior to trial, the United States entered into a settlement in the form of a
consent decree with Turner on behalf of the class. The decree provided
that the defendant United States would make "every good faith effort" to
fill supervisory positions at Eglin with blacks "in proportion to the per-
centage of blacks in the occupational category wherein the vacancy
arises," and that "seniority, back pay and other appropriate relief might
be awarded to individuals injured by government failure to enforce the
terms of the consent judgment.
24 5
Raymond Little, a member of plaintiff class, claimed that defendant
Air Force violated the consent judgment in the course of twice failing to
appoint him to vacant positions. The district court, finding that defend-
ant Air Force had failed to make the required "good faith effort" in Lit-
tle's case, ordered that Little be placed in a vacant supervisory position
and awarded back pay. Defendant Air Force appealed. In affirming, the
court of appeals found that the Air Force indeed had violated the "good
faith" provisions of the consent judgment, and that the district court had
239. Marsh v. Board of Educ., 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985) (mem.), petition for cert filed, 54
U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1859).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
241. See Hazlewood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
242. This conclusion is valid unless the Supreme Court gives the broadest reading to Justice
White's opinion in Stotts. See supra note 162.
243. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (1Ith Cir. 1985),petition for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-177).
244. Tofani, Lawmakers Seek to Preserve Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, May 4, 1985, at A6,
col. 1; Tofani, U.S. Takes New Tack Against Use of Quotas, Wash. Post, March 1, 1985, at A3, col. 4.
245. Turner, 759 F.2d at 820.
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awarded an "appropriate" remedy authorized by the consent judg-
ment.246 The court further found Stotts inapplicable because the consent
judgment here was "voluntary" and, therefore, was protected by the
Supreme Court's Weber analysis, because no third party rights were in-
volved in the remedy of appointment to a vacant position.247
The court of appeals considered whether Stotts should be read to bar
relief awarded under a consent decree when that relief could not be
awarded in a coercive judicial action. Agreeing with the Sixth Circuit in
Vanguards,4 s the court of appeals found the "voluntary consent judg-
ment in this case entirely consistent with Title VII, a law triggered by a
Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to im-
prove the lot of those who had been 'excluded from the American dream
for so long.' "249 For this reason, the court rejected the United States'
argument that Stotts barred relief: "As Weber made clear, Section 706(g)
[the remedial section of title VII] does not bar voluntary affirmative ac-
tion agreements, such as the consent judgment in this case; it is merely a
limit on what a court may require in a coercive action under Title
VII." 250
F. Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend
211
The South Bend Board of Public Safety concluded in June 1979 that a
"disparity existed between the percentage of minorities in the [Police and
Fire] Departments and the percentage of minorities in the City."' 252 The
Board noted that the work force of the departments was composed of
5.3% minorities, while the city of South Bend was composed of 14.1%
minorities.25 3 The task force had recommended in January, 1983 that
the city hire minorities according to a two-to-one preferential hiring
plan. 4 The plan was designed to produce a work force reflecting the
minority population of South Bend within five years. The board ac-
246. Id. at 826.
247. Id. at 824.
248. Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
249. Turner, 759 F.2d at 826 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 265, 304 (1979)).
The Turner court did not address the question of whether judicially prescribed race-conscious goals
could exist in a contested litigation. The Court limited itself to holding that a consent decree is
"voluntary" within Weber. Turner did not concern itself with Stotts' intimation that there cannot be
affirmative race-conscious goals that may benefit a minority person who is not a "specific victim" in
the Franks-Teamsters sense, see supra note 42.
250. Turner, 759 F.2d at 821.
251. 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. July 16, 1985)
(No. 84-1936).
252. Id. at 559.
253. Id. at 558.
254. The task force made this proposal although it "did not find that the hiring procedures were
discriminatory." Id.
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cepted the proposed plan and maintained two hiring lists, one each for
minority and non-minority applicants.255 A continuing departmental
panel also was established which periodically would recommend the
number of applicants to be hired. In November 1980, the Board, on rec-
ommendation of the panel, hired four minority applicants and one non-
minority applicant.
Plaintiff Janowiak, a white male applicant for a post in the fire depart-
ment, alleged racial discrimination and pursued a title VII action, first
through the EEOC and then in federal court. Janowiak claimed viola-
tions of both his title VII and equal protection rights. The city defended
the alleged discrimination on the ground that the action taken was pursu-
ant to a valid voluntary title VII affirmative action plan, which was
"designed to remedy the statistical disparity between the percentage of
rfiinorities in the population of the city and the percentage of minorities
in the Fire Department." '256 The district court granted the city's motion
for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals agreed that the Bakke- Weber-Fullilove test allows
a voluntary affirmative action plan to remedy past racial discrimination.
The Bakke requirement of "findings of past discrimination by a compe-
tent body" was satisfied because the Board of Public Safety was such a
"competent body,"25 but the court was dissatisfied with the substance of
the Board's finding. No circumstances here approached those in Weber:
no "glaring statistical disparity between the percentage of black
craftworkers employed and the percentage of blacks in the work
force '  and no "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segre-
gated job categories ' was found. Turning to the equal protection issue,
the court reached the same result. In Bratton,2 ° statistical disparity was
complemented by other evidence of racial discrimination, while here only
weak statistics were offered. Not enough evidence existed for a summary
judgment upholding the plan on the basis of either title VII or equal
protection.
The decision in Janowiak was handed down over six months after
Stotts,261 yet the court of appeals made no reference to that case. This is
understandable because Janowiak involves not a court judgment but a
purely voluntary affirmative action plan; therefore, Stotts does not apply
255. The operating principle accepted by the Board was that "minority representation on the
Police and Fire Departments should be consistent with the minority composition of the commu-
nity." Id. at 559.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 561.
258. Id. at 562.
259. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (emphasis added).
260. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984).
261. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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by any reasonable interpretation. 262
Unlike the other docket cases, the proponent of the affirmative action
goals in Janowiak, the municipal department, lost in the court of appeals
and has petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.263
Other affirmative action cases have been decided in the courts of ap-
peals since Stotts.264 In some of those cases, the Supreme Court already
has denied certiorari. Still other cases raising affirmative action issues
have been decided in the district courts but have yet to produce appellate
court rulings. 265  However, the cases already on the Supreme Court
docket for this Term fairly raise the arguably open questions. Assuming
that the Supreme Court is not prepared to demolish entirely the structure
of possible affirmative action goals as a remedy for past racial discrimina-
tion, the following questions are posed in these 1985 docket cases:
266
1. Was adequate substantiation of past discrimination found?
2 67
2. Was the substantiation of past discrimination authenticated by a
responsible body (or bodies)?
2 61
3. Were affirmative action goals reasonably necessary to remedy the
demonstrated past racial discrimination?
United Steelworkers v. Weber 269 (title VII) and Fullilove v. Klutznick
270
(equal protection) require that affirmative action goals answer the follow-
ing additional questions affirmatively:
4. Does the affirmative action plan not "unnecessarily trammel the
262. Like Turner, Janowiak is clearly distinguishable from Stotts. However, equally like Turner,
the Janowiak court did not explore the ramifications of Stotts' "specific victim" intimation. See
supra note 249.
263. Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), petition for cert.
filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. July 16, 1985) (No. 84-1936).
264. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 748 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984); Bushey v. New York
State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 571 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), affid mem., 767 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.
1985); Board of Educ. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984); Kromnick v. School Dist.,
739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
265. United States v. City of Buffalo, 609 F. Supp. 1252 (W.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. City
of San Diego, 43 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 868 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 1985); Hammon v. Barry, 606 F.
Supp. 1082 (D.C. 1985); NAACP, Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 36 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 434 (BNA) (E.D. Mich. 1984); Geier v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Tenn. 1984);
Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1984); NAACP v.
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
266. See cases cited supra notes 1-3.
267. This question is central in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 179-92).
268. This question is most strikingly involved in Wygant. Considerations of the impact of a
consent decree on substantiation are presented by Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.
Ct. 59 (1985) and Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (1lth Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3149 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-177).
269. 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 52-78.
270. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 144-69.
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interests of white employees"2 71
5. Is the affirmative action plan "temporary?"
272
6. Is the affirmative action plan sufficiently "flexible?"2 7 3
If these questions are answered affirmatively, and a "voluntary" plan is
involved, little question exists that the affirmative action plan is con-
trolled by Weber, at least when the plan concerns employment and,
therefore, title VII. In Weber, craft training jobs were allocated on a fifty-
fifty basis between black and white applicants. The plan had been
adopted "voluntarily," although not entirely spontaneously, by the em-
ployer and the plant union. The union and employer defended the plan,
both arguing that they had been stimulated to adopt the plan out of fear
of suit by black employees, and from the pressures on them from the
Office of Contract Compliance, the office charged with enforcing Execu-
tive Order 11246, which demanded affirmative action from government
contractors. 274 The Court found these fears or pressures unwarranted;
the plan was still "voluntary," and a voluntary plan which satisfied the
above listed factors was permissible under title VII.
The Weber Court expressly excluded from its decision "what a court
might order to remedy a past proven violation of the Act."'2 75 Avoiding
the similar issue in Fullilove, the Court gave constitutional approval to a
congressionally-enacted, race-conscious "set-aside" that met the Weber
test but twice warned that no decision on the power of a court to order
remedial racial preferences was being made.2 76
The Fullilove Court did recall those school desegregation, employment
discrimination, and voting rights legislation cases in which court-pro-
posed, race-conscious remedies had been upheld.277 The "limited" pow-
ers of a federal court allow a racial or ethnic factor to be used as an
equitable remedy "[w]here federal anti-discrimination laws have been vi-
olated. ' 27' This judicial power is limited in that a "federal court is re-
quired to tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to fit the nature and extent of
271. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
272. Id. at 208-09. In Weber, this test was satisfied in that the "[p]referential selection of craft
trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the
Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force." Id. at 208-09.
273. This requirement includes not only the Bakke ban against a rigid quota (assuring 16 places
to minority applicants among the 100-place admission total), Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289, 319, but also
embraces the Fulliove caution that the plan should exclude both the unqualified, and those blacks
who have not actually suffered in some way from the past racial discrimination that the preferential
plan was designed to remedy, Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482, 487-88. Therefore, the black contractors in
Fulliove who had prospered in the period of general race discrimination in the business could not
benefit from the preference.
274. See supra note 9 and infra note 350.
275. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200.
276. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480, 483. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
277. Id. at 483.
278. Id.
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the . .. violation." '27 9 Reviewing the federal anti-discrimination laws,
Chief Justice Burger did not cite an affirmative action goals case, but didcite the trilogy of Franks, 280 Teamsters, 28' and Albemarle,282 all individ-
ual victim redress cases.
One could argue that in Stotts283 the Court, for the first time, dropped
the other shoe. The Department of Justice, for many years a supporter
of affirmative action goals, now argues that the courts of appeals have
gone astray; that the Supreme Court never approved affirmative action
goals 284 in a coercive judicial decree beyond the "individual victim" situ-
ation of Franks, Teamsters, and Albermarle. Assistant Attorney General
William Bradford Reynolds, the chief Department of Justice point man
on this issue, concedes that the Court upheld affirmative action goals in
"voluntary" plans satisfying certain conditions in Weber.285 However,
Reynolds maintains Weber was "wrongly decided" and should be
overruled.286
Several of the courts of appeals decisions on the 1985 Supreme Court
docket seriously considered the possibility that the Court is prepared to
take the additional step intimated by Justice White in Stotts (although
this step was not necessary to the decision). Read most expansively, Jus-
tice White's language would limit judicial power to prescribe affirmative
action goals as an "appropriate" remedy under title VII's remedial sec-
tion217 to "specified victims." Several of these majority opinions rest
their "case" squarely on the ground that a "consent judgment," while
containing both "consent" and "judicial" elements, should be considered
"voluntary" within the scope of Weber.288
The Court, in view of the "foster settlement" design of title VI12 89-
279. Id.
280. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See supra notes 42-44
281. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See supra notes 42-
44.
282. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
283. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). See supra notes 130-51
and accompanying text.
284. Compare the United States' amicus briefs in support of affirmative action goals in Bakke
and Weber (and, of course, the United States' brief defending congressional set-asides in Fullilove)
with the government's amicus briefs opposing affirmative action in Williams and Stotts. In Williams
Judge Wisdom recited that the Department of Justice was reported to have pressured the EEOC to
withdraw its brief in support of affirmative action. Williams, 727 F.2d at 1572 n.5 (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting). The EEOC brief was brought to the attention of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals by
two amici curiae who filed the brief as an appendix to their brief. Id.
285. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 448 (1978). See supra notes 52-73.
286. See supra note 78.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (1982).
288. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985), petition for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-177); Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert granted
sub nom. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
289. See Williams, 729 F.2d at 1572 n.6, where Judge Wisdom calls attention to "the clear intent
of Congress [in title VII] to favor voluntary settlement." The Supreme Court has stated that "Con-
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that consent decrees and EEOC conciliation agreements2 9° should be
considered "voluntary"-could dispose of certain cases on the docket on
this ground.291 However, the grant of certiorari in Local 638292 raises a
broader issue: Can affirmative action goals be prescribed as an extraordi-
nary judicial remedy for identified past racial discrimination that is not
limited to "specific victims" in the Franks-Teamsters sense2 93 by a federal
court after trial? The courts of appeals presently assume they have such
power, absent instructions otherwise from the Supreme Court. They uni-
formly have concluded that such affirmative relief may constitute an "ap-
propriate" exercise of remedial power that is well within the Supreme
Court's admonition that a "federal court is required to tailor 'the scope
of the remedy' to fit the nature and extent of the. . . violation.
294
Assuming that Weber's "voluntary" affirmative action goals are left
intact by Wygant, a crucial question still awaits Supreme Court decision:
Should a consent judgment, which obviously has both "voluntary" and
"coercive" aspects be considered "voluntary" for purposes of Weber?
We have seen this question raised squarely by Vanguards295 and
Turner.2 96
Whatever is decided regarding "consent judgments," a still broader
question remains: Will the Supreme Court carry out the threat of Justice
White's ominous language in Stotts when an outcome depends on such
threat?2 97 Against the expressed views and practice of every court of
appeals, will the Court proclaim the death knell of the carefully crafted
judicial remedy of rare and moderate affirmative action goals? Of the
cases now on the 1985 docket, Local 638298 directly raises this question.
Some courts of appeals seriously considered the intimations of Justice
White's opinion in Stotts that the Court may be on the verge of limiting
affirmative remedial relief to identified "victims" of discrimination.
However, the Supreme Court may not insist on specific "victims" in the
gress expressed a strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimina-
tion claims." Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981). See supra text
accompanying note 28.
290. For the consequences to an employer when entering a conciliation agreement which disad-
vantages a majority employee, see W.R. Grace v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 226, 247.
292. EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985).
293. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See also supra text accompanying notes 42-39, 83-84, 124.
294. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483.
295. Vanguards, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 224-33.
296. Turner, 759 F.2d 817 (1lth Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed 54 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Sept.
10, 1985) (No. 85-177); see supra text accompanying notes 246-253.
297. See supra text accompanying note 130.
298. EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 211-
22.
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same limited sense of Franks and Teamsters.2 9 9 Justice White's design
may require only that the beneficiaries of affirmative action goals be "vic-
tims" of the identified discrimination in some sense just as the black bene-
ficiaries of the preferential training program in Weber were perceived to
be, in some sense, victims of the "manifest racial imbalances in tradition-
ally segregated job categories."3" In Turner,3"' the plaintiff, as a long
time employee, was in some sense the victim of the proven racial discrim-
ination in appointments to supervisory positions at Eglin Air Force base,
while in Marsh,3"2 the benefited employees were in some sense victims of
the long-standing racial discrimination in the Jackson school system. A
somewhat more relaxed interpretation of "victim" might call for addi-
tional elements of proof but would not be a critical obstacle to all race-
conscious affirmative action goals. In contrast, should the Supreme
Court restrict its "victim" analysis to the "specific victims" of Franks
and Teamsters,30 3 race-conscious affirmative action goals would be all
but laid to rest as the courts have understood them.
In reaching such a drastic result, the Court could hold that this issue
never has been expressly considered 3 4 and that the Court's past denials
of certiorari carry no substantive implication.3"5 Neither the text nor the
legislative history of title VII or the history of the equal protection clause
would explain such a turnabout in judicial practice. The Supreme
Court's controlling concern would be the Court's "new" view of legisla-
tive and constitutional "policy." Policy would be at the root of a deci-
sion whether or not a consent decree could ever be considered
"voluntary" under a Weber analysis, whether being "victims" in some
sense would suffice for race-conscious relief, or whether the strict Franks-
Teamsters view of "victims" would be required despite the contrary con-
clusion of all courts of appeals reading the same statute and the same
constitution.
What policy considerations could move the Supreme Court to defini-
tively terminate use of affirmative action goals as a remedy for past dis-
crimination by adopting the strict "victim" analysis? Conversely, what
(perhaps unspoken) policy considerations would give the Court pause?
299. See supra text accompanying notes 42-39, 83-84.
300. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209. Similarly, the unspecified group beneficiaries of race-conscious
goals in school desegregation or voting rights cases were, in some sense, "victims" of the identified
racial discrimination.
301. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 248-49.
302. Marsh v. Board of Educ., 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes
233-42.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 243-50.
304. The constant interpretation of Bakke- Weber-Fullilove by the courts of appeals, see supra
note 60, and the explicit, yet cautious, language of Fulilove (Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.) and Bakke
itself (Powell, J.), see supra text accompanying notes 141-61, would make such a suggestion
disingenuous.
305. See supra note 195.
185 *
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III. THE QUESTION OF POLICY
The method by which the Supreme Court decides questions of consti-
tutional and statutory law, when the constitutional or statutory text, leg-
islative history, or recent decisions of the Court are not clear, is a vexing
question upon which judges and scholars speak with conflicting voices.30 6
Most agree, however, that Justices weigh background reasons that
loosely may be called considerations of policy. When different Justices
give different weight to the same policy reason, the end-product often is
the decision of a closely divided Supreme Court. The questions concern-
ing race-conscious affirmative action goals obviously fall into this cate-
gory. Although the Supreme Court has decided only four such cases,3" 7
petitions for certiorari in numerous others have been considered and re-
jected.308  The Supreme Court undoubtedly has read and reread count-
less opinions from judges on the courts of appeals and petitions and
jurisdictional statements from attorneys seeking Supreme Court
review. 0 9
306. Compare Justice White's discussion in Stotts of the legislative history of title VII, 104 S. Ct.
at 2590 n.15, with the analysis of the same legislative history by Justice Blackmun, id. at 2609-10,
and Judge Skelly Wright, Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1293 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In Segar v. Smith, Judge J. Skelly Wright concedes that "Im]any in Congress spoke in 1964, and
again in 1972 when Title VII was amended, to assure wavering supporters that Title VII could not
be applied to grant preferences for those who were not victims of discrimination." 738 F.2d 1249,
1293 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Wright denies that this establishes "that promotion goals and
timetables are invalid if they benefit any individuals who are not proven victims of discrimination."
Id. On the contrary, Judge Wright insists that:
[t]hese statements are. . . inapposite to the question before us in this case. Those in Congress
who made such statements were not considering the issue whether in affording relief for proven
discrimination against a broad class some individual nonvictims benefited. Rather, these state-
ments were made with reference to the question whether Title VII could be used as a mandate.
to correct overall racial imbalance in an employer's workforce when such an imbalance had not
been shown to be the result of discrimination.
Id.
Among copious scholarly comment, see R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316-31 (1985)
(interpretation of of the 1964 Civil Rights Act favorable to affirmative action goals); Duncan, The
Future of Affirmative Action.: A Jurisprudential Legal Critique, 17 Civ. RTs. & CONST. L. L. REV.
503 (1982); Jones, 'Reverse Discrimination'in Employment: Judicial Treatment of Affirmative Action
Programs in the United States, 25 How. L.J. 217 (1982); and, Mishkin, The Use of Ambivalence:
Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
907 (1983). See also A. BICKEL, supra note 39, at 133; CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DOORS OF JOB OPPORTUNITY-A POLICY OF FAIRNESS AND
COMPASSION THAT HAS WORKED (1984) [hereinafter cited as CITIZENS' COMM'N]; Meltzer, The
Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Anti-Discrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980) (critical of affirmative action goals); Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring
and Admissions: A Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COL. L. REV. 534 (1975).
307. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 265 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
308. See cases cited supra notes 81, 91, 93-95, 162.
309. A petition for certiorari (and the opponent's reply thereto) are often mini-briefs making
specific legal arguments why the Supreme Court should (or should not) grant discretionary review in
this one particular case among many. Likewise, the jurisdictional statement which is submitted on
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In deciding any of the docket cases in which the Court has granted, or
may grant, certiorari this Term, the Justices will unlikely be introduced
to, or moved by, any new policy considerations. By now, they are surely
acquainted with all the arguments. Nevertheless, some of these policy
arguments are worth recalling when considering the most crucial issue in
these cases: whether affirmative action goals should be limited to the
Franks-Teamsters "specific victim" relief.31°
A. Policies Favoring Limitation Of Affirmative Action Goals
1. The "Philosophical" Arguments
The "moral" argument311 suggests that affirmative action beyond
"specific victim" relief is "immoral" because all should agree that racial
discrimination against anyone, white persons or otherwise, is immoral.
The counterargument is that "morality" always has included "justice,"
and justice entails a group restorative remedy for a group wrong, here,
identified past race discrimination. Both moral and political philoso-
phers and moralists have differed in their conclusions depending upon
whether they accept as dominant the original wrong of identified race
discrimination, or the remedy of affirmative action goals.
Another argument advanced is the "equality argument," i.e., preferen-
tial goals do not treat whites, blacks, and other minorities equally. By
definition, preferential goals advantage present blacks over present
whites; therefore, whites and blacks are not treated with "equality." As
with the moral argument, the counterargument and conclusion depend
on the starting point. The counterargument also recalls that equality re-
lates to persons similarly situated. One thing equality is not, and that is
treating equally those who are unequally situated.
Largely philosophical, the "merit" argument asserts that the United
States is a meritocracy.312 Individuals should advance on the basis of
individual merit, and not on the basis of race, or other preference. The
counterargument takes a variety of forms.3 13 First, the premise that we
appeals of right (and the opponent's reply) are mini-briefs to convince the Court to set down the
appeal for briefing and oral argument, rather than decide the case summarily on the appeal papers.
310. See supra note 44.
311. "[A] racial quota derogates the human dignity and individuality of all to whom it is applied;
it is invidious in principle as well as practice." A. BICKEL, supra note 39, at 133. See also infra note
430.
312. A complete equation of merit with justice may be found in Kristol, "When Virtue Loses All
Her Loveliness"-Some Reflections on Capitalism and "The Free Society," PUB. INTEREST, Fall
1970, at 3 (cited in R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 344 (1974)). At opposite philo-
sophical poles from Rawls, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), Nozick justifies only "a
minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement
of contracts, and so on. R. NozIcK, supra at ix. See also R. NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EX-
PLANATIONS (1981).
313. See J. RAWLS, supra note 312.
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are or should be a meritocracy is denied. As much as merit, political
friendships or campaign contributions lead to important posts such as
ambassadorships. Also, judgments of merit are hard to justify even
where posts ostensibly pass by merit. Such judgments often are an illu-
sion, or a camouflage, for less becoming bases of choice.314 The "camou-
flage" concern here is that the unexpressed racial preference for whites
(already identified in proven past racial discrimination) will likely pre-
vail, styled as merit, without at least a moderate legitimate express reme-
dial racial preference for minorities.
2. The "Color-Blind" Constitution Argument
The "color-blind" argument purports to be a "constitutional" argu-
ment, rather than one of morals or philosophy. Proponents of this argu-
ment usually cite the dissenting opinion of the first Justice Harlan in
Plessy v. Ferguson,3 15 the unfortunate Supreme Court decision which laid
the groundwork for seventy-five years of segregated schools and Jim
Crow laws. The argument boldly states that "the Constitution is color-
blind"; and because "race-conscious goals" by definition are not "color-
blind," they are not constitutionally acceptable. Among many versions
of the counterargument one might recall those of Justice Blackmun,316
Justice Powell,317 Judge Skelly Wright,31" and, surprisingly, the Reagan
[A] meritocratic society. . . follows the principle of careers open to talents and uses equality of
opportunity as a way of releasing men's energies in the pursuit of economic prosperity and
political dominion. There exists a marked disparity between the upper and lower classes in both
means of life and the rights and privileges of organizational authority. The culture of the poorer
strata is impoverished while that of the governing and technocratic elite is securely based on the
service of the national ends of power and wealth. Equality of opportunity means an equal
chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the personal quest for influence and social position..
Id. at 106-07.
In his path-breaking, but controversial book, Rawls rejects meritocracy as the hallmark of justice
in a democratic society. He also rejects the utilitarian criterion of the greatest good for the greatest
number in favor of what he calls "the difference principle" as the foundation of "justice as fairness":
"the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless
doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate." Id. at 75. Rawls' notion has been under steady
attack by Nozick, see supra note 317, and other philosophers, see N. DANrI.s, READING RAWLS
(n.d.).
314. For example, consider a situation where the choice is among closely ranked candidates for
one available faculty post. A recent television program focusing on affirmative action posed this
situation involving three white and one black faculty tenure aspirants as a case study.
315. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
316. I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in a ra-
cially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In
order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no othe; way. And in
order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-
let the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate [sic] racial supremacy.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1977) (Blackmun, J.).
317. "The time cannot come too soon when no governmental decision will be based upon immu-
table characteristics of pigmentation or origin. But in our quest to achieve a society free from racial
classification, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer from the effects of identifiable
discrimination." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). "As this
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Administration's Secretary of Labor, William Brock.319
3. The Pragmatic Arguments
One pragmatic argument often advanced is that affirmative action does
not work. The perception that affirmative action has not succeeded in
accomplishing its goals of increasing the participation of black citizens in
American economic and social life concerns many people.32° The
counterargument is that affirmative action goals have resulted in signifi-
cant gains, but not enough gains to discontinue their use.321 The evi-
Court has recognized, the implementation of any affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimina-
tion is likely to affect persons differently depending upon their race. See, eg., North Carolina Board
of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. at 45-46." Id. at 508.
318. The purpose of this legislation [Civil Rights Act of 1964] cannot be denied: to help
blacks and members of other minority groups overcome the prejudice that oppresses them. Its
effect is to give special advantage to those minority groups. To call such legislation 'color blind'
is a meaningless abstraction. Legislation against invidious discrimination helps one race and
not the other because one race and not the other needs such help.
Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 220-21 (1980).
319. "I think this country is going to have some form of affirmative action for a considerable
period of time into the future. There is a distinction which you can make between absolute numbers
and quotas and so-called goals approaches." Address by Secretary of Labor William E. Brock,
NAACP Convention, Dallas, Tex. (June 24, 1985) (cited in Wash. Post, June 25, 1985, at A4, col. 2).
320. The economic arguments advanced since the early 1970's by certain black economists, such
as Professor Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams, see Douglas, Rights Groups Move to Protect Gains,
N.Y. Times, June 23, 1985, at 10, col. 1, that blacks have not been economically advantaged by the
preferential programs of the 1970's and 1980's seem to have been outdistanced by impressive statis-
tics compiled by others, see infra note 326. However, criticism of affirmative action goals by some
black intellectuals has continued, with emphasis now being placed on psychological and prestige
costs. See, eg., Loury, Beyond Civil Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1985, at 22; Howard & Ham-
mond, Rumours of Inferiority, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1985, at 17.
An observer of these contentions from outside the black community concedes that the "calcula-
tion is complex," but adds that "it is hard to credit the argument that on balance affirmative action
actually harms blacks." Krauthammer, A Defense of Quotas, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 16 & 23,
1985, at 9, 11. Krauthammer concludes: "Usually advanced by opponents of affirmative action, this
argument is about as ingenuous as Jerry Falwell's support of the Botha regime out of concern for
South African blacks." Id. at 11.
321. See R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES, NARROWING THE GAP? (1984). Using Labor De-
partment (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Bureau of Census statistics, Farley concludes that of the
three suggested appraisals, (1) that no progress had been made since the 1960's, (2) that the black
population had been polarized into a black elite which had prospered and a black underclass which
had not, and (3) that black gains are widespread and significant, the third is the most accurate. A
brief selection from Farley's study includes the following data:
Black income in 1959 was 53.1% of white income; in 1982 it was 55.3%. Id. at 13. Overall
unemployment figures showed 9% black compared to 5% white in 1950, and 16% black compared
to 8% white in 1982. Id. at 39. In 1960, 39% of whites held white-collar jobs compared to 14%
blacks; in 1982 there were 44% whites and 30% blacks in white collar jobs. Id. at 48. Annual
earnings in 1959 were $10,200 for whites compared with $5,000 for blacks. In 1969 annual earnings
were $15,000 for white men and $8,800 for black men. By 1979 the gap narrowed to $14,600 for
whites and $9,300 for blacks; white women earned $4,000 compared to $2,000 for black women. By
1979 black women were earning $4,800, in advance of white women, $4,700. Id. at 66. But in 1982,
35% of black families were below the poverty line, compared to 11% of white families. Id. at 206.
In 1960, 16% of whites and 5% of blacks had completed college. By 1982, 25% of whites and less
than 12% of blacks had completed college. Id. at 19.
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dence is impressive as to gains made, but inconclusive on the
contribution of affirmative action in producing such gains. A partial an-
swer may be sought in the decline in black admissions to professional
schools following the Bakke32 decision. Some fragmentary evidence ex-
ists in the experience 2 3 of some business concerns with affirmative action
programs, and in the leverage that Executive Order 11246324 has had in
fostering "voluntary" affirmative action plans.325
Some argue that sufficient gains have been made already, therefore, the
use of affirmative action goals should be discontinued. This surprising
argument contradicts the previous one. While applauding the gains
made through the use of affirmative action goals, and reaffirming their
necessity in the 1960's and 1970's, the proponents of this argument con-
clude that the time is at hand to discontinue special legal helps to remedy
past discrimination.32 6 Professor Blumrosen, a keen student of employ-
ment discrimination law, cites several instances in which the Supreme
Court has backed away from earlier endorsements of what he calls
"southern jurisprudence. "327 Blumrosen believes these early decisions
were necessary in those decades; however, he points out that "[iun 1980,
some 2,461,000 minority employees, or 22.6% of the minority employ-
ees, were in significantly higher occupations than those in which they
would have been if the occupational distribution of 1965 had been cur-
322. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
323. Testimony of American business concerns as to the impact of affirmative race- and sex-
conscious goals in dismantling racial discrimination in the American work force is contained in the
distinguished report of the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights. See CrrzENs' COMM'N, supra
note 307, at 122-46. The report specifies the experience and testimony of some major American
corporations including American Telephone and Telegraph Co., id. at 126; IBM, id. at 126-27;
Peabody Coal Company (the nation's largest coal producer), id. at 128; the five largest banks in
Cleveland, Ohio, id. at 129; the Equitable Life Assurance Society, Hewlett-Packard Company, the
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Control Data Corporation, Xerox Corporation and Federated De-
partment Stores, id. at 130-41; McDonald's, Miller Brewing Co., Merck & Co., and Johnson and
Johnson, id. at 142-46.
The sixteen members of the Citizens' Commission include three former Secretaries of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, a former Republican attorney general, a former Republican
solicitor general, a former Republican deputy attorney general, a former assistant attorney general
for civil rights, a former Secretary of Labor, two former Chairs of the EEOC, one former EEOC
member, two former Chairs of the United States Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR), and three
former members of the USCCR. The Director of the Citizens' Commission, and an editor of the
report, is William L. Taylor, former Staff Director of the USCCR. For anyone interested in a non-
ideological, experienced approach to the problem of affirmative action, with all its complexities, this
report is an excellent place to begin.
324. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R.
654 (1967), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 28 (1982).
325. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 n.9.
326. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence of Employment
Discrimination, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 313 (1984).
327. "Southern jurisprudence" is used to mean the sympathetic race discrimination decisions
emanating from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1960's and 1970's. Id.
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rent."3 8 He also relates that 21.6% of all blacks included in the 1980
EEOC data "were employed in higher-paying and higher-status catego-
ries than would have been the case had black workers been distributed
through the occupational categories in the proportions of 1966.
"329
Blumrosen acknowledges that "there is serious concern that once the
Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of Title VII, a resurgence of dis-
crimination could resegregate the work force."330 He confidently affirms
that "[t]his will probably not happen, ' 331 and he suggests that a twilight
of such "southern jurisprudence" would be appropriate. The counter-
argument to Blumrosen's theory is that a twenty-one to twenty-three per-
cent inprovement leaves seventy-seven to seventy-nine percent of blacks
still disadvantaged. Most certainly, this disadvantage results from the
racial discrimination in education and employment that functioned
openly under legal and constitutional protection until the 1960's. "At
this point," counters Blumrosen, "the questions become political. How
much of a change is 'enough' is a basic value judgement which cannot be
made through rational processes alone."' 332 Blumrosen's preference is
that "the law should withdraw when the industrial relations system oper-
ates fairly without such extensive judicial or administrative supervi-
sion."' 333 The counter-question is again whether the system is operating
"fairly" when seventy-seven to seventy-nine percent of blacks are unac-
counted for in terms of equal treatment, and when unchallenged black
unemployment figures cry out for repair. The concern cited by Blum-
rosen himself remains whether further Supreme Court "withdrawal"
could lead to "a resurgence of discrimination [which] could resegregate
the work force."
334
4. The "Goals" Are "Quotas" Argument
The argument that affirmative action "goals" are simply "quotas" ad-
vances the idea that no distinction can be made between affirmative ac-
tion "goals" and the rigid "quotas" which have been banned by the
Supreme Court since Bakke.335 The premise is that the mere use of an
arithmetic measure for progress in an affirmative action plan constitutes
328. Id. at 347-48.
329. Id. at 340.





335. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Supreme Court
struck down the reservation for minorities of 16 of 100 available seats in the state medical school.
The five Justices constituting the Court majority on this point did so for differing reasons, see supra
note 144. Nevertheless the federal courts have uniformly accepted the Bakke result to rule out a
rigid race-conscious "quota." See, eg., infra text accompanying note 342.
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a "quota." '336 Hyman Bookbinder, the Washington representative of the
American Jewish Committee, and a long-standing opponent of rigid quo-
tas, offers the counterargument. Bookbinder says "quota means that a
given number or percentage of positions is set aside for the exclusive use
of a particular group; it means that no others need apply." '3 37 The six-
teen reserved minority seats in Bakke constituted a "quota."33 How-
ever, continues Bookbinder, "[a] goal means a reasonable, realistic target
that could be reached by diligent, nondiscriminatory recruiting and
training from among qualified job-seekers; no penalties or sanctions are
possible when good faith efforts are established." '339 Bookbinder opposes
the Reagan Administration's proposed revision of Executive Order
11246340 because such a revision would ban these "goals" as well as
"quotas. ' 341
Admittedly, many courts have tended to use the terms "goals" and
"quotas" interchangeably, while conceding that a rigid quota was barred
by Bakke. 342 Lately, the federal courts have refined the terminology in
accord with the definitions given by Bookbinder.343 As Bookbinder con-
cludes, to outlaw "goals and timetables . . . would have a devastating
chilling effect on all affirmative action.",3 ' That is the aim of the Reagan
Administration in revising Executive Order 1124634' and of the Justice
336. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
[O]ur cases make it unmistakably clear that . . . '[s]tatistical analyses have served and will
continue to serve an important role in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a dis-
puted issue. . . . We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof, where it reached
proportions comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection cases. . . . Statistics are equally competent in proving employment
discrimination.
Id. at 339 (citations and footnote omitted).
337. Bookbinder, What A Quota Is-And Isn't, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1985, at A22, col. 4.
338. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.) ("If petitioner's purpose is to assure within the student
body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such
a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid."). See supra note
335.
339. Bookbinder, supra note 337.
340. See infra note 345.
341. Bookbinder, supra note 337.
342. As recently as Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit, a
leading edge in affirmative action development, was using the terms in this way.
343. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers'Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985).
344. Bookbinder, supra note 337.
345. On July 23, 1985, the Administration's consideration of substantial modification of Execu-
tive Order 11246 became known. Williams, White House Split on Bias Underscored, Wash. Post,
July 24, 1985, at AS, col. 1. Secretary of Labor William Brock, whose department is charged with
administration of the Executive Order, had stated earlier that:
[t]here is a distinction which you can make between absolute numbers and quotas and so-called
goals approaches. . . . But we as a country have lived for 200 years with a major part of our
population in remarkable disadvantage, and it takes some time to recover from that. Maybe we
(the generation of white Americans) were not here then. But that does not change the obliga-
tion we have as citizens to respond to that situation. ...
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Department in opposing any relief other than "specific victim" affirma-
tive action in the courts.
346
5. The "Fairness" Arguments
One "fairness" argument proposes that affirmative action goals place
an unfair burden on whites. This aspect of "fairness" centers on the fact
that white employees are disadvantaged under title VII. For example,
sometimes whites are not employed or promoted so that the employer
may exercise the required "good faith effort" to achieve an affirmative
action goal. 34' The counterargument is that the so-called "innocent"
white employee is not completely "innocent." Although he has not actu-
ally participated in the identified racial discrimination, 348 he has bene-
fited from the racial atmosphere which led to the discriminatory
preference for whites. This counterargument is not entirely convincing.
A more adequate response is that the "disadvantage" concern already is
embodied in the Weber-Fullilove requirement that the affirmative action
goals not "unnecessarily trammel' 34 9 the interests of white employees.
When the "disadvantage" is held to be so great as to "unnecessarily
Williams, Brock Backs Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, June 25, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
On October 11, 1985, the headline read: "Brock May Lose Authority Over Affirmative Action-
Revised Executive Order WouldBe Victory for Meese." Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1985, at A2, col. 3. The
text of the article noted that the current draft, "which is all but final," would permit "voluntary use
of numerical goals and timetables.. . so long as they are not used and do not operate to discrimi-
nate and grant a preference to any person on the account of race, color, sex, religion or national
origin." Id. However, the article continues, "the order would virtually eliminate the Labor Depart-
ment's only real enforcement weapon, the power to debar companies from federal contracts. Id.
This power, in force since the Nixon Administration, has rarely been used, but its presence has been
a lever for the department to secure compliance by recalcitrant companies." Id.
The Washington Post labels the latest development, Affirmative Action Policy Gains a Reprieve-
Cabinet Moderates Mount a Surprisingly Strong Defense. Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
The article states that "what looked like a fait accompli two weeks ago was suddenly in question
again." Id. Two days later, the N.Y. Times reported: "Rarely has an issue divided the Reagan
Administration as deeply as a proposal to rewrite a 20-year-old executive order that requires affirma-
tive action by government contractors." Pear, The Cabinet Searches for Consensus on Affirmative
Action, N.Y.Times, Oct. 27, 1985, at E5, col. 3.
The question remains unresolved as this Article goes to press, but the incomplete narrative tells
something of the process at work.
346. Eg., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984); see supra note 110
and accompanying text. In Firefighter's Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), the
Solicitor General, Rex E. Lee, presented this position for the United States as amicus curiae. Id. at
2581.
347. A recent district court case rejected race-conscious promotion goals on this ground, while
approving race-conscious hiring goals. Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082 (D.D.C. 1985).
348. When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior
discrimination, such 'a sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible. ...
Moreover, although we may assume that the complaining parties are innocent of any discrimi-
natory conduct, it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past
some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the vir-
tual exclusion of minority firms from these contractive opportunities.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 (1980) (Burger, C.J.).
349. See cases cited supra note 94.
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trammel" the interests of white employees, the affirmative action goals
are disallowed. This "fairness" concern is a strong consideration in those
circuits which expressly have ruled that affirmative action goals should
be employed rarely-and not at all when other remedies would suffice.35
For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals used this ground in
Local 638 to strike down part of the affirmative action relief awarded by
the district court.351 This "fairness" argument also is heeded in the
warning of the Supreme Court in Fullilove. There the Court stated that
the affirmative action remedy must be "narrowly tailored" to remedy the
identified past discrimination. 52 Furthermore, the Fullilove Court indi-
cated that merely disappointing non-minority expectations is not in itself
a constitutional defect barring affirmative action goals.
353
Another "fairness" argument contends that affirmative action goals
benefit some minorities who have not been disadvantaged by the identi-
fied discrimination. This contention is that affiative action goals per-
mit benefits to be awarded preferentially to minority individuals who
were not in any sense victims of the identified discrimination. For exam-
ple, black persons who have themselves prospered in the midst of the
identified past discrimination would gain an unfair disadvantage if they
were to be beneficiaries of affirmative action goals. A counterargument
has been made that such successful black persons should be entitled to
preferential treatment. Because the past discrimination was directed to
all blacks, the remedy should be given to all blacks, even to those who
nevertheless have managed to prosper. The Supreme Court seems to
have rejected this contention. A more adequate counterargument is the
Court's stipulation in Fulilove that for affirmative action goals to be
valid, these goals must be "flexibly" administered. Only "qualified"
members of a minority group may be beneficiaries of the affirmative pref-
erence. However, "flexible" also means denying a racial preference to
one who has been in no way disadvantaged by the identified discrimina-
tion. The existing Bakke-Weber-Fullilove354 formula already gives ample
scope to this "fairness" argument.
A third "fairness" argument advances the idea that permitting affirma-
tive action goals as a remedy for past sexual and racial discrimination
350. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172, 1188 (2d Cir.), cert granted sub nor. Local
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Asss'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens &
Co., 585 F.2d 625, 646 (4th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). See also supra text accom-
panying notes 208-17.
351. 753 F.2d 1172, 1188 (2d Cir. 1985).
352. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1979).
353. "It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint the expectation of
nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of
prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." Id. at
484 (Burger, C.J.).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 155-60.
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leaves white male employees at an additional disadvantage. According
to this argument, fostering affirmative action goals in employment and
promotion of both women and minorities in certain companies and gov-
ernmental agencies results in a double obstacle to white male employ-
ment. The counterargument is that this admitted difficulty is already
within the control of the courts under the "unnecessarily trammels"
prong of the Bakke-Weber-Fullilove formula. The courts have taken
pains to insure that affirmative action goals do not double-dip at the ex-
pense of white male employees and prospective employees.35 5 An addi-
tional and somewhat questionable counterargument would be available
should the Supreme Court adopt Judge Wisdom's additional ground for
upholding affirmative race-conscious goals, the thirteenth amendment.
3 56
Because the thirteenth amendment concerns only race and not sex, this
would root title VII more squarely in remedying race discrimination than
in remedying sex discrimination. 7 Some support for this view derives
from the undoubted fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was primarily
directed at eliminating race discrimination.358 The addition of sex dis-
crimination to the Act's prohibition was an unscheduled fortuity.
359
However, because the congressional statute bars both race and sex dis-
crimination, the Court is unlikely to interpret the statute in such a way as
to give lesser remedial relief for sex discrimination.
6. The Black Majoritarian Argument
The "black majoritarian" argument, almost unspoken, states that in
many political subdivisions, blacks are no longer a political minority be-
cause of enhanced black participation in government. 3 1' In these situa-
tions, a danger exists that the black majority officialdom will adopt race-
conscious affirmative action hiring and promotional goals which will un-
duly restrict white access to jobs and promotions. The counterargument
concedes that any affirmative action goals which "unduly" restrict white
employment and promotional access should not be enforced; however,
355. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. City of Chicago, 663
F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
356. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 727 F.2d 1554, 1577 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 114. Justice Powell twice has cited the thirteenth
amendment as giving additional grounds of support to appropriate race-conscious goals. Fulliove,
448 U.S. at 500, 508; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 n.41.
357. In the contrasting constitutional setting, the Bakke Court has been taken as requiring a
compelling state interest to justify affirmative action goals at the same time justifying sex-conscious
affirmative action goals with a less strict test--"substantial relation to an important state interest."
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). This is one anomaly that the Court must be
anxious to eliminate at the earliest opportunity.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 65-69.
359. See supra text accompanying note 26.
360. For example, in Detroit, Mich. and Washington, D.C.
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affirmative action plans by both black and white officialdoms are subject
to the same rules of appropriateness of race-conscious relief for past dis-
crimination. One fairly may expect these rules would be enforced uni-
formly by the federal courts. The careful limits set by the Bakke- Weber-
Fullilove361 standards for determining the appropriateness of race-con-
scious affirmative action goal relief in these situations would apply as
central safeguards in the use of these rules. Understood in this context,
the black majoritarian argument appears so offensive that understanda-
bly this is one argument that remains almost unspoken.
7. The "Demeaning to Blacks" Argument
A final argument for limiting affirmative action goals to specific victim
relief states that these goals are in fact demeaning to blacks and, there-
fore, disadvantageous to blacks. Racial preference leads blacks to ques-
tion the validity of their successes, and also lessens their motivation to
strive for success. This argument has had surprising vitality and has
been cited judicially by friends of affirmative action and by distinguished
black intellectuals.362 The counterargument is rooted in the persistent
evidence that no matter how valid the anxieties raised, the economics of
employment and unemployment 363 at the time, if temporarily, foreclose
dispensing with constructive affirmative remedies to repair the damage
caused by two centuries of race-conscious burdens.
B. Policy Objections to "Specific Victim" Analysis
1. The Congressional Policy Argument
The congressional policy in enacting title VII furnishes the basis for an
argument in support of voluntary affirmative action goals. In Weber, the
Supreme Court concluded that "Congress' primary concern in enacting
the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of the Negro in our econ-
omy.' ,64 After citing the significant increase in black unemployment
from 1947 to 1962, the Court determined that "Congress feared that the
goals of the Civil Rights Act-the integration of blacks into the main-
stream of American society---could not be achieved unless this trend
were reversed., 365 Against the background of this interpretation of con-
gressional purpose, the Court concluded that "it would be ironic indeed
361. See supra note 60 and text accompanying notes 152-55.
362. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 n.3 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part) ("[P]referential treatment may act to stigmatize its recipient groups, for although intended
to correct systemic or institutional inequities, such a policy may imply to some the recipient's inferi-
ority and especial need for protection."); Howard & Ray, supra note 321; Loury, supra note 321.
363. See supra note 322.
364. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202.
365. Id. at 202-03.
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if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice
and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been excluded from
the American dream for so long'. . constituted the first legislative pro-
hibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish tradi-
tional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." '366
Although the Supreme Court was concerned with a voluntary plan in
Weber, the Court's assessment of congressional policy in enacting title
VII is of primary relevance in considering any interpretation of title VII
which would change the conclusions of all the courts of appeals that af-
firmative action goals meeting the Bakke- Weber-Fullilove test are also
responsive to the same congressional design.367 The argument is not that
the result in Weber entails permitting affirmative action goals in non-
voluntary cases. Weber left that question to be decided at another
time.368  However, the Weber Court's determination of congressional
policy tilts strongly against the view that Congress intended to bar af-
firmative action goals in all cases that do not involve "specific victims" in
the strict Franks-Teamsters369 sense.
The counterargument would confine Weber, and all that was said by
the Court in that case, to the voluntary situation. The Court's heavy
borrowing from Weber in Fullilove,370 a non-voluntary case involving
identified Congressional goals, undermines the counterargument. Oddly
enough, the public pronouncement by Assistant Attorney General Reyn-
olds (speaking for the Department of Justice and the Reagan Adminis-
tration) that Weber was "wrongly decided" also undermines this
argument. Reynolds sees Weber as inconsistent with the "specific vic-
tim" restriction and desires to see Weber overruled.37'
2. The Constitutional Argument
One well known constitutional argument originated in the three Civil
War amendments372 and the Slaughter-House Cases.373 In Slaughter-
House, the first case to interpret the Civil War amendments, the Supreme
Court declared that:
366. Id. at 204.
367. Justice Blackmun confirms this in Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2606 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See supra note 42
368. Weber, 443 U.S.at 200.
369. See supra notes 42-44.
370. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486, 490.
371. See supra note 78.
372. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. Justice Powell in Bakke conceded the force of this
constitutional argument but said such force was outdistanced by later events. Bakke, 438 U.S. at
291-95. In Fullilove he seemed to relent somewhat: "[uIn our quest to achieve a society free from
racial classification, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer from the effects of identifi-
able discrimination." 448 U.S. at 516.
373. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of
each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested
[was] the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen
from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited do-
minion over him.3 74
In that case we also find the Court's first interpretation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is
so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
will be necessary for its application to any other.
375
The Slaughter-House Court then adverted to the enforcement power of
Congress: "If, however, the States. did not conform their laws to its re-
quirements, then by the fifth section of the article of [the fourteenth]
amendment Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legisla-
tion. ' 376 Equally well known is that neither the Supreme Court nor Con-
gress began to fulfill these commitments until the turn-around in Brown
v. Board of Education377 in 1954 and the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960's.
The argument is that this national commitment, verified by the con-
temporary Supreme Court, has been neither expressly repudiated nor ad-
equately fulfilled. One would have thought this commitment had been
renewed by the civil rights legislation of the 1960's378 and the concordant
judicial decisions of the 1960's and 1970's. 37 9 If anything, this declared
constitutional policy would call for extending 380 rather than narrowing
374. Id. at 71.
375. Id. at 81.
376. Id.
377. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Judicial implementation of this turn-around was tortuously slow with
respect to school desegregation, as the Supreme Court itself finally recognized in Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
378. Besides the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e(17) (1982), with its
emphasis on desegregation of public facilities (title II) and employment discrimination (title VII),
there was the notable Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973dd-6 (1982), and the
Civil Rights (Fair Housing) Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
379. Notably, two sets of Supreme Court decisions exist: (1) those banning government-spon-
sored racial discrimination against blacks and other aggrieved minorities and (2) those granting
exceptional affirmative equitable remedial relief for identified discrimination. See supra notes 34, 37,
40 and accompanying text. Perhaps the culmination of the first set of cases was the Court's pro-
nouncement in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States:
Congress, in Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . .clearly expressed its agree-
ment that racial discrimination in education violates an important public policy.
The government interest at stake here is compelling. As discussed [earlier] the Government
has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education--dis-
crimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years of this nation's history.
103 S. Ct. 2017, 2030, 2035 (1983).
380. Two prime candidates for reconsideration would be San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
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available remedies to insure "the security and firm establishment of that
freedom, and the protection of the newly [desegregated, newly-freed from
discrimination in employment, newly-emancipated from Jim Crow,
black] citizens from the oppressions [generated from seventy-five years of
Supreme Court decisions prior to Brown]. ''38 1 This passage contains
strong language, but the recent Supreme Court has used stronger.382
The counterargument is that this commitment has been outdated by
later events: the equal protection clause now has other clients that make
renewal of its original design unfeasible.383 Even Congressional legisla-
tion concededly enacted in reparation to black citizens should not be in-
terpreted so as to in any way disadvantage others.384
One reply to the counterargument is that the new clients, women and
new minorities, along with blacks, should be given remedies adequate to
undo past discrimination without unduly trammeling others.385 A sec-
ond reply is that suggested by Judge Wisdom, 386 and hinted at by Justice
Powell,387 that the thirteenth amendment, which concerns race alone,
could be used to give adequate scope to the remedies afforded by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
A related argument states that the Supreme Court's renewal of the
original promise of the Civil War amendments should be continued. Af-
ter Brown,388 the Supreme Court has expressly authorized group race-
conscious relief upon proof of past discrimination, particularly in the
school desegregation, voting rights, and employment discrimination
fields.389 In his influential Bakke opinion, Justice Powell insisted upon
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (permitting differential state and local expenditures for education
keyed to the wealth of the school district) and Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (restricting
interdistrict remedies for school desegregation short of a proven constitutional violation in each
district).
381. This passage purports to portray the current plight in the framework of Slaughter-House.
See supra text accompanying note 374.
382. Consider the "strong language" of Justice Powell in Fullilove: "In the history of this Court
and this country, few questions have been more divisive than those arising from governmental action
taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions played no small part in the tragic legacy of
government-sanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857)." 448 U.S. at 516.
383. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292-94 (Powell, J.) ("As the Nation filled with the stock of many
lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from
official discrimination.").
384. This position is recognizable in the "constitution is color-blind," "race-conscious goals are
immoral," and "equality excludes preferential race-conscious goals" language emanating from high
governmental sources. See supra notes 311-19.
385. Judge Skelly Wright asserts that this has been, in fact, the design of the federal courts of the
past generation. If anything, he sees greater tolerance for affirmative remedial relief for non-racial
groups. Wright, supra note 319, at 213.
386. See supra notes 113-14.
387. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 608, 610; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 n.41.
388. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
389. See supra notes 34, 37, 40. This has been acknowledged by Chief Justice Burger in Fulli-
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authoritative findings of past racial discrimination as a predicate for af-
firmative relief.390 Once that predicate is established, Justice Powell gives
no hint of disapproval of group (rather than merely "specific victim")
relief. For the Executive Department to demand such a retrogressive
requirement before the reparative task had fairly begun raises questions
beyond mere callousness and infidelity to national promises.39'
The counterargument truthfully recites that equal protection never
was applied exclusively to blacks and relies on Justice Powell's Bakke
dismissal of Slaughter-House: "The clock of our liberties, however, can-
not be turned back to 1868. . . . It is far too late to argue that the guar-
antee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special
wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded
others.,
39 2
The question, of course, is not a revival of special wardship, but effec-
tive relief for severely disadvantaged groups. One does Justice Powell an
injustice to treat this passage from Bakke as his last word on the subject.
Two years later in Fullilove he softened the rigorous compelling state
interest test he had proposed in Bakke to "means. . . equitable and rea-
sonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination., 393 He also
rejected the "color-blind" principle: "The time cannot come too soon
when no governmental decision will be based upon immutable character-
istics of pigmentation or origin. But in our quest to achieve a society free
from racial classification, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still
suffer from the effects of identifiable discrimination., 391 Justice Powell
then, in passing on the constitutionality of the Congressional minority
set-aside, went on to state: "I believe that the Enforcement Clauses of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar
measure of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of racial
discrimination." '395 One would expect these words to support similar
"discretion to choose a suitable remedy" under title V11 396 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Another argument is that universal concurrence of the courts of ap-
peals in affirmative action goal relief beyond "specific victims" adds
love, 448 U.S. at 484, 490, Justice Powell in both Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, and Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
508, and the Brennan Four (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White) in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 378.
390. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
391. See supra discussion at notes 84, 205, and 344, concerning filing of amicus briefs by the
United States in Williams, Stotts, and Wygant, seeking restriction of reparative relief to the "specific
victim" category of Franks and Teamsters, see supra note 42.
392. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (emphasis original).
393. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510
394. Id. at 516.
395. Id. at 508 (emphasis in original).
396. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (1982).
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weight. The argument is that when all the courts of appeal,3 97 reading
the same Constitution, the same statute, and the same Supreme Court
decisions, agree that affirmative action goals beyond "specific victim" re-
lief are within statutory and constitutional limits, the Supreme Court
should hesitate to proscribe non-specific victim relief.
The counterargument is that the Supreme Court has the final word in
the federal judicial system as to what the Constitution and statutes
"mean" and that the Court has not hesitated to dislodge views of the
courts of appeals in the context of title VII interpretation. In Team-
sters, 98 for example, against the views of several courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court held that bona fide seniority systems which perpetuate
past discrimination are not for that reason in violation of title VII.
No one questions that the Supreme Court has the last word. The ques-
tion is what that word will be. One may wait long for the citation of an
instance in which the Supreme Court holds that all the courts of appeals
were wrong in their interpretation of constitutional or statutory lan-
guage. Certainly the unanimous position of the courts of appeals adds
weight; that is all this argument contends.
3. The "General Caste" Argument
This argument contends that the general caste nature of the wrong of
racial discrimination justifies a group-wide rather than merely a "specific
victim" remedy. The school desegregation 399 and voting rights cases,
illustrate the Court's acceptance of group-wide, rather than merely "spe-
cific victim" relief. As Justice Blackmun has said, "The purpose of such
relief is not to make whole any individual, but rather to remedy the pres-
ent class-wide effects of past discrimination or to prevent similar discrim-
ination in the future.""4  For this reason,
such relief is provided to the class as a whole rather than to its individual
members. . . The distinguishing feature of race-conscious relief is that
no individual member of the disadvantaged class has a claim to it and
individual beneficiaries of the relief need not show that they were them-
selves victims of the discrimination for which the relief was granted."°2
A further reason for this relief was suggested by a veteran senior judge of
the court of appeals who earned his stripes in the "southern jurispru-
397. See cases cited supra note 81.
398. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
399. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
400. See, eg., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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dence'" 3 of the 1960's and 1970's: Where "discrimination in a state
governmental unit is system-wide, institutional, and the product of a long
history of discrimination against blacks as a group to continue what
amounts to a caste system .... I would hold that the requested relief is
within the district court's power to grant."'
The counterargument would dismiss these comments as merely con-
trary views culled from dissenting opinions. The question here, however,
is not the "authoritativeness" of these views. Rather, of concern is the
accuracy with which they reflect the remedial relief which the Supreme
Court had already countenanced," 5 and the underlying justification.
4. The "Domestic Tranquillity" Arguments
An argument often is made of a state interest in the domestic tranquil-
lity in curing the effects of past discrimination. Since the time of Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, the Court has agreed that a compelling state
interest exists in remedying the effects of past racial discrimination.4"6
As Judge Wisdom points out, "This interest focuses on group representa-
tion in employment and is distinct from that focused on the individual's
right to be free from discrimination. .... Thus, the state's interest cannot
be served adequately by a remedy that addresses only the rights of identi-
fiable victims." 7
The counterargument is that Justice Powell spoke only for himself in
Bakke on this point and that the other four Justices who would have
upheld race as a factor in an affirmative remedy did not accept a "com-
pelling state interest" analysis, but rather an intermediate "substantial
relation to an important state interest" test. The counterargument is ac-
curate, but inconclusive. Five Justices in Bakke agreed that, with appro-
priate findings of past discrimination, affirmative group relief is
appropriate to satisfy the state's interest in remedying the effects of that
racial discrimination."° Furthermore, Justice Powell in Fullilove re-
403. Blumrosen, supra note 326.
404. Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1559, 1573 (5th Cir.1984) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
405. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 37, 40, 152-55.
406. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (Powell, J.). Id. at 369 (Brennan,
J.). The Brennan Four used a less strict test, characterizing the required state interest as merely
"important" rather than "compelling." See infra note 408.
407. Williams, 729 F.2d at 1575 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
408. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.). Id. at 362 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White,
JJ., concurring). As previously noted, the Brennan Four used a less strict test. See supra note 412.
This test, although adapted to the past racial discrimination situation, was in design the same test
which the Court had used in judging the constitutionality of "benign" gender discrimination.
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). On the other
hand, Justice Powell's "compelling state interest" test made sustaining affirmative race-conscious
goals as remedies for identified past discrimination more difficult than doing the same with affirma-
tive sex-conscious goals.
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lented from his strict compelling state interest test.409
A related argument concerns the state's interest in "operational
needs." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized
that improved law enforcement resulting from minority participation in
the police force constitutes a compelling reason for affirmative action
goals.410 The same reasoning would extend to fire departments and, ar-
guably, to teacher staffs measured by minority student population. This
last element borrows strength from the judicial developments concerning
school desegregation 41' and first amendment support for educational
choices. 4 12  The Supreme Court will face this concern this Term in
Wygant.
413
The counterargument correctly denies that the "operational needs" de-
fense has ever received the approval of the Supreme Court and questions
whether, in any event, such an agreement could be extended to justify the
teacher-student ratio used in Wygant.
4 14
5. The Pragmatic Arguments
One pragmatic argument is that a "specific victim" limitation to af-
firmative action goals would present a difficult evidentiary problem of
identifying "specific victims" of the identified racial discrimination. The
argument is that many black citizens would not have applied for posi-
tions in a racially discriminatory company or government department
because of perceived obstacles to being hired, or, if hired, promoted.415
Further, Congress' intent in title VII to secure voluntary settlement
would be set back by a requirement that a "victim identification" phase
be a part of every consent decree proceeding.416 The counterargument
concedes the difficulties, but insists that title VII nevertheless will bear a
"specific victim" interpretation.
409. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508, 510 (1980).
410. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984);
Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938
(1981).
411. See supra text accompanying note 34.
412. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Powell, J.).
413. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2015 (1985).
414. Id.
415. "A police department that is perceived as anti-black in hiring and promoting inhibits appli-
cations from blacks who are deterred from applying by the department's discriminatory practices. It
would be impossible to identify these individual victims." Williams, 729 F.2d at 1572 (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
416. A consent decree is not an appropriate vehicle to identify actual victims. Every Title VII
suit would require a phase II judicial proceeding to determine which individuals would be enti-
tled to relief. This approach would contravene the clear intent of Congress to favor voluntary
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Another pragmatic argument contends that improvements to date in
desegregation of the national work force do not justify termination of the
remedy of affirmative action goals. This argument is the converse of the
Blumrosen argument, which cited a twenty-one to twenty-two percent
improvement in the status of black workers since the enactment of title
VII as justifying withdrawal of sympathetic reparative judicial interpre-
tation of the Civil Rights Act,417 including affirmative action goals be-
yond "specific victims." With seventy-eight to seventy-nine percent of
the potential black work force still disadvantaged from past discrimina-




In interpreting the Constitution, the courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, are notably the countermajoritarian force, expected to protect mi-
norities against the sweep of current hostile political tides.418 In a com-
parable way, with statutes, the courts do not allow a perceived later
popular consensus to abridge rights which an earlier Congress has em-
bodied in reparative legislation.419 Quite contrary to Mr. Dooley's apho-
rism ("The Supreme Court follows the election returns."),42 the Court
ideally is the one institution of government sufficiently independent to
withstand either a sudden regressive turn or an active majoritarian indif-
ference to minority rights.
Congress has the power to repeal or amend reparative statutes and to
alter judicial interpretations of provisions which it deems excessive. As
yet, Congress has not so acted as to title VII.421 The Executive branch
417. See supra text accompanying notes 326-33.
418. This proposition has been widely recognized as almost self-evident with respect to the Bill
of Rights, and the Civil War amendments (ie., thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth), which were
obviously designed as curbs on majoritarian power. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTJ-
TIONAL LAW 454-55 (1969); Fiss, supra note 40.
419. Consider, for example, the adjacent field of jurisdictional statutes, where the Court has
assumed Congressional awareness (and implied endorsement) of the Court's interpretation (or gloss).
Absent congressional revision, the Court continued to apply its judicial "gloss." See, e.g., Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). But see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Court confessed its past "error").
420. See MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW (E. Bander ed. 1963). "[N]o matther whether
th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns." Id. at 52. Mr.
Dooley, the alter ego of the celebrated American humorist Finley Peter Dunne, wrote in Irish dialect
in "approximately five hundred essays that appeared from 1892 to 1914 in Sunday newspapers and
magazines." Id. at vi. The editor of this anthology cites Professor Arthur John Keeffe: "Time has
come for Law Schools to require that applicants have a knowledge of Finley Peter Dunne and Mr.
Dooley. The ones that think like Dooley are sure bets." Id. at v. (citing Keeffe, Practicing Lawyer's
Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 44 A.B.A. J. 994, 996 (1958)).
421. A strong argument, not accepted by the Supreme Court, is that Congress by its 1972
204
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can insure weak or unsympathetic enforcement of civil rights statutes by
its power of appointment to the Department of Justice422 and the
EEOC.42 3 The Administration can chill civil rights research by its ap-
pointments to the Civil Rights Commission 424 and can cancel or nullify
an executive order, even one which has for over twenty years stimulated
minority employment among government contractors by use of affirma-
tive action goals.425 The Executive branch can, by its power of appoint-
ment, constitutionally seek to change the policy posture of the federal
courts.426 High-level Justice Department officials may even have a first
amendments of title VII in effect ratified the affirmative goal remedy decisions of the federal courts.
See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2590 n.15; supra note 306.
422. On June 27, 1985, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 10 to 8 against the nomination,
Wash. Post., July 16, 1985, at AS, col. 1, "amid criticism that [Reynolds] had been lax in enforcing
civil rights laws and had misled the Senate Judiciary Committe in sworn testimony," Kurtz & Wil-
liams, Democrats Oppose Reynolds Promotion, Wash. Post, July 17, 1985, at A3, col. 1. On July 17,
1985, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole announced that "the Reagan administration has aban-
doned efforts to salvage the nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be associate attorney gen-
eral." Kurtz, Administration Drops Reynolds Nomination, Wash. Post, July 18, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
423. Members appointed to the EEOC require Senate confirmation of their appointments.
424. The Citizens' Commission report recounts that "[o]ne of the most sudden and striking re-
versals of federal affirmative action policy occurred with respect to the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights." CrrlZENS' COMM'N, supra note 263, at 115. From its founding in 1957 during the Eisen-
hower Administration, "[t]he [Civil Rights] Commission has traditionally served as the conscience
of federal civil rights enforcement and policy, establishing the facts and urging federal action." Id. at
115. As late as November 1981, the Civil Rights Commission concluded that "[w]ithout affirmative
intervention, discriminatory processes may never end. Properly designed and administered affirma-
tive action plans can create a climate of equality that supports all efforts to break down the struc-
tural, organizational and personal barriers that perpetuate injustice." Id. at 118. This policy
statement was "unanimously approved on a bipartisan basis after more than two years work." Id.
By contrast, the Commission (newly constituted by the Reagan Administration with five new mem-
bers and two holdover members), "reversed the prior endorsement of numerical race-conscious rem-
edies after a single day's meeting at which no witnesses were asked to, or did testify." Id. at 118-19.
425. See supra note 345.
426. In a remarkably candid interview with the National Public Radio (NPR) program "All
Things Considered" on August 28, 1985, Fred Fielding, counsel to President Reagan and chairman
of the White House committee which recommends to the President the appointment of federal
judges, frankly avowed the ideological criteria of the Reagan Administration's judicial selection pro-
cess. After candidates have been interrogated and proposed by the Department of Justice, "[W]e
work very hard to try to identify the kind of candidate to recommend to the President for nomina-
tion"-those whose philosophical views accord with the President's, "our client."
Fielding insists that "[w]e do not have a litmus test on specific issues. The kind of question that
would be asked of you by the Department of Justice would be to try to elicit from you your outlook
as to what the role of the court should be. Now they may ask you about specific cases in the past,
but the question is not directed to would you decide the case the same way but more to see how you
would decide it, how you would approach the case. . . There is no one factor."
The interviewer, Nina Totenberg of NPR, asked Fielding if he would be surprised to hear that
unsuccessful women candidates for the federal bench had been asked their views on abortion. Field-
ing said he would, but quickly added: "However, I'm not one who asks the questions so I'm not the
person who really should be answering that. I don't know what they're asking in that specific re-
gard. It's my understanding that they're not asked specifically about their views."
Asked about the status before his committee of a candidate who had been "active in the pro-choice
movement" or "very active for defendants' rights," Fielding conceded that "[t]he example you just
gave is someone whose philosophy probably is not one that would make the final cut." On the other
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Amendment right to call Supreme Court decisions "wrongly decided,"42 7
and an executive right to ask the courts to change them.428 However, the
Chief Executive also has the constitutional duty to "take care that the
Laws be faithfully executed."429 Such would seem to require more reac-
tion to appointed officials who flout the Civil Rights Act than to reward
them with higher posts.43°
In this posture the Supreme Court is, indeed, a lonely eminence, belea-
guered and nagged at to cut back on its proudest claim: Ubi ius, ibi
remedium-where there is a right, there is a remedy. An old maxim of
the common law, this claim was given a center place by Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison431:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protec-
hand, when asked if the committee favored "particularly young" candidates in view of the life tenure
of federal judges, Fielding said, "Yes, we do."
In contrast, Judge Lawrence Walsh, chief judicial selector (as Deputy Attorney General) for the
Eisenhower Administration, told the interviewer he would not ask judicial candidates how they
would analyze a particular case, but rather process them on the basis of "complete integrity, and
their judicial temperament and their professional qualifications."
In contrast to President Carter's appointment of 37 black federal judges and 40 women among his
175 appointments to the federal judiciary, in his first term President Reagan appointed 2 black and
13 female judges among his 160 judicial appointments as of the date of the program. Asked whether
there was anything improper in the philosophical bias of the Reagan Administration judicial selec-
tion process, Professor Herman Scwartz of American University Law School responded: "I don't
think so. But I don't think that it's good for the country if he's too successful." Interview with Fred
Fielding, "All Things Considered," National Public Radio, Aug, 28, 1985 (discussing White House
efforts to recruit federal judges).
427. See supra note 78.
428. See supra note 391.
429. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
430. In January 1984, William J. Bennett, as Chairman of the National Endowment for the
Humanities, a Reagan appointee to that government department,
refused to set numerical goals for women and minorities employed by the endowment, as re-
quired by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, because, he said, he believes in
'human equality.'
'Under its current leadership, this agency will neither favor nor slight anyone because of race,
color, national origin, religion, or gender,' Bennett wrote to the EEOC.
'To believe in human equality and equal liberty can mean nothing less than to treat white and
black, male and female, Jew and Gentile as morally equal,' Bennett continued. 'We strongly
believe that different or special treatment by this agency on the basis of these characteristics
offends our best principles ...
Feinberg, Rival Teacher Unions Split on Bennett, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
In January 1985 Bennett was nominated by President Reagan as his Secretary of Education. Id.
Bennett was in good company. The Department of Justice itself "has maintained its refusal to sub-
mit goals and timetables (to the EEOC) as part of its own affirmaive action plan, making it, as of
January 1984, one of two agencies whose plans have not been approved by the EEOC; 110 federal
agencies have complied and had their plans approved." CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 307, at 101-
02.
In early 1985, William Bradford Reynolds, the leading advocate in the Administration of the non-
compliance-with-the-EEOC program, was nominated to the number three post in the Department of
Justice. On July 16, 1985, this nomination was rejected by the Senate. See supra note 422.
431. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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tion. . . .The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the viola-
tion of a vested legal right.4 32
Affirmative action goals beyond "specific victims" may not be, in Mar-
shall's sense, a "vested right." "Equal protection of the laws ' 433 may be
more a promise than a "vested right"-long promised, still unfulfilled.
But the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
certainly covenanted to the nation's black citizens a "right"-"the inte-
gration of blacks into the mainstream of American society. ' 434  In
Bakke, a majority of the Supreme Court acknowledged that, given find-
ings of past discrimination, affirmative group relief was a proper constitu-
tional and statutory remedy to secure that right. 35 Only the Supreme
Court can take back that promise-practically speaking.436 Ubi ius, ibi
remedium.
IV. CONCLUSION
The affirmative action cases already heard, and to be heard, by the
Supreme Court in its 1985 Term raise three significant questions:437 (1)
whether a consent decree will be deemed "voluntary" for purposes of
affirmative action; 38 (2) whether a consent decree may embody relief
which a judge could not award in a contested action;439 and-most im-
portant of all-(3) whether in a contested action, a federal court may
award affirmative goal relief that may advantage persons who have not
been proven to be "specific victims" of particular invidious discrimina-
tion as a remedy for past racial or sexual discrimination." 0
432. Id. at 163.
433. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
434. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202.
435. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 202-03.
436. Perhaps Congress might take back this promise through its control over the jurisdiction
and remedies of the federal courts. The limits of that congressional power over remedies are severely
contested with respect to constitutional rights. Of course, there is always the possibility of a consti-
tutional amendment to repeal pro tanto the fourteenth amendment-but not a lively possibility.
437. "The petition for certiorari shall contain . . . [t]he questions presented for review ...
The statement of the question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly
included therein." Sup. Ct. R. 21.
438. Implicitly raised in the "questions presented" as to which certiorari was granted in Van-
guards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3191-92 (U.S. Oct. 8,
1985) (No. 84-1999).
439. Specifically raised in the "questions presented" as to which certiorari was granted in Van-
guards. Id.
440. Specifically raised in the "questions presented" as to which certiorari was granted in Van-
guards, id., and EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cert granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3191 (Oct.
8, 1985) (No. 84-1656). The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari reads: "The petition for certiorari
is granted. The case is set for oral argument in tandem with No. 84-1999, Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters v. Cleveland .. " Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106
207
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The "specific victim" issue-first surfaced in a Supreme Court opinion
in Stotts"-constitutes the whole enchilada of affirmative action as it
has been understood for a generation by friend and foe alike. If affirma-
tive relief is to be reduced by the Court to the kind of "specific victim"
relief awarded in Franks and Teamsters' 2 (as urged by the Department
of Justice) affirmative goals and time tables to remedy past discrimina-
tion will be an episode of the past.
Two considerations beyond broken national promises may influence
the Court to decline to discard prematurely this moderate and carefully
crafted incentive to eliminate racial polarization in the nation's work
force and other national institutions. One of these considerations re-
sponds to the question: What kind of society do we want? The second
raises an institutional question long felt keenly by the Supreme Court:
What is the place of the Court in the American constitutional system of
government? The Court's answer this Term to the "specific victim" issue
in these affirmative action cases seems intimately related to its degree of
concern with each of these questions.
What kind of society do we want? For a time-between the Civil
Rights Cases"3 in 1883 and Brown v. Board of Education4 in 1954-the
answer was clear: a racially polarized society. Present Justices have ac-
knowledged the active participation of the Supreme Court in this unfor-
tunate national decision.445  The more recent answer-starting with
Brown and nourished by the congressional legislation and executive or-
ders of the 1960's and 1970's, and the judicial remedial response of the
1970's and 1980's-was that such racial polarization was invidious and
must be erased. Now comes the national administration with the sooth-
ing message that it is time for business as was usual: away with un-
American group remedial relief." 6 An economist, Professor Lester C.
S. Ct. 58 (1985). Interestingly, the attorney of record for the EEOC is the Solicitor General of the
United States.
441. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
442. See supra note 44 and text accompanying notes 297-303.
443. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
444. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
445. See supra note 387.
446. See supra notes 430, 436. The Department of Justice's opposition to affirmative action
goals, of course, antecedes Stotts. In Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cerL
denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984), the Department of Justice intervened strongly, though unsuccessfully,
to persuade the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, furnishing the Court with the following statement
of its position:
We are concerned about the adoption of race-conscious, non-victim-specific remedies, particu-
larly by any institution other than Congress. We have profound doubts whether the Constitu-
tion permits governments to adopt remedies involving racial quotas to benefit persons who are
not themselves the victims of discrimination - at least in the absence of a clear statement by
Congress itself acting pursuant to its broad remedial authority under the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments, requiring the use of such remedies.
Memorandum of U.S. in Support of Petition for Certiorari, at 9, Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d
878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1984).
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Thurow, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, sharply focuses
on premature abrogation of group relief as the surest medicine for insur-
ing a permanently racially polarized society. In his well-known study,
The Zero-Sum Society,' 7 Thurow's thesis is that "[a] zero-sum game is
any game where the losses exactly equal the winnings," and that even
when "[o]n average, society may be better off. . . this average hides a
large number of people who are much worse off."" 8 Thurow cites famil-
iar statistics with respect to black employment," 9 emphasizing that
"[b]lack unemployment has been exactly twice that of whites in each dec-
ade since World War II," and concluding that without affirmative relief
"there is nothing that would lead anyone to predict improvements in the
near future.
450
No substitute exists for providing "extra aid to those who were handi-
capped in the past until they catch up," '451 unless we are content to per-
petuate present disparities: "An individualistic ethic is acceptable if
society has never violated this individualistic ethic in the past. To shift
from a system of group discrimination to a system of individual perform-
ance is to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination into the present
and the future." '452
Thurow does not deny the costs of affirmative action. "[A]ny govern-
ment program to aid economic minorities must hurt economic majorities.
This is the most direct of all our zero-sum conflicts, '4 53 but he questions
the sincerity of dismissing group relief, as such.
Affirmative action for economic minorities may be on the defensive, but
we are in an age when industrial and regional programs are expanding
rapidly. The same people who oppose special programs for blacks sup-
port special programs for textiles. Imagine the furor that would arise if
we started a program for blacks similar to that now in place for farmers.
It would be denounced as 'un-American' from every rooftop.454
What kind of society do we really want? Thurow truly "zeroes" in on
an answer: "Given that our society clearly is not willing to be consistent
and use an individual focus when it comes to politically popular groups,
it is easy to see why the insistence on an individual focus for minorities
can be viewed as simply a more sophisticated version of discrimina-
tion. ' 455 If one's answer is the unacceptability of perpetual racial polari-
zation there is thus no immediate escape from at least the moderate
447. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980).
448. Id. at 11-12.
449. Id. at 185-86.
450. Id. at 185.
451. Id. at 188.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 183.
455. Id. at 182.
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affirmative action enforced in the federal courts. In Thurow's words,
"The problem ... cannot be left to the economy to solve. Major ele-
ments of the problem are not being solved at all and where progress is
being made it is so slow that economic minorities would have to be pa-
tient for many more years." '456
What is the place of the Supreme Court in our governmental system?
In the posthumous publication of his Godkin Lectures,45 7 Justice Robert
H. Jackson cited the role of the Supreme Court: "to establish an in-
dependent judicial branch, neutral as between government and individ-
ual, class and class, party and party, and to utilize this independence and
neutrality to maintain the principle balances upon which our system
rests."458 The recent vehement reactions by members of the Court45 9
against Executive Department attacks on its constitutional decision-mak-
ing4t° constitute reminders that the Court remains jealous of its indepen-
dence and constitutional charge.
Executive pressures on the Court are no new development. Current
Justices recall the defeat in 1937 of President Roosevelt's plan to add six
new Justices, a plan proposed just months after his popular sweep of
forty-six of forty-eight states.461 The "Court-packing plan" was suffi-
ciently popular to be the central issue on which Lyndon Johnson won his
first election to Congress.462 That Court was sufficiently unpopular to be
456. Id. at 189.
457. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (1955).
Justice Jackson died on Oct. 9, 1954 before delivering the lectures at Harvard University. The drafts
he had prepared were edited and published by his law clerk and his son. Id. at vii.
458. Id. at 2.
459. Exhibiting the most recent reactions are Justice William Brennan, see, eg., Taylor, Brennan
Opposes Legal View Urged By Administration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at A4, col. 2, and Justice
John Paul Stevens, see, e.g., Kamen, Stevens Rebuts Meese Criticism of High Court, Wash. Post, Oct.
26, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
460. Thornton, Meese Attacks Miranda Decision, Wash. Post., Aug. 26, 1985, at A6, col. 1. The
first paragraph of that article read, "Attorny General Edwin Meese III yesterday attacked the
Supreme Court's Miranda decision on the rights of criminal suspects as 'infamous' and wrong." Id.
Referring to the Warren Court, Meese also stated in the same interview on "This Week With David
Brinldey" that the Supreme Court was engaged in "'wholesalely upsetting cases and inventing new
law.' " Id.
Criticising a 1985 Supreme Court decision on establishment of religion, Education Secretary Wil-
liam Bennett stated that the Constitution "now became, in the hands of aggressive plaintiffs and
beguiled judges, the instrument for nothing less than a kind of ghettoizing of religion." Rasky,
Bennet Assails Curb on Aid to Parochial Schools, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1985, at Al8, col. 4.
Apprarently it was in response to such media attacks on the Supreme Court that Justices Brennan
and Stevens made their out-of-Court responses. See supra note 459.
461. Useful accounts of the "Court-packing plan" are contained in J. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE
LION AND THE Fox 293-315 (1956), Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-
Packing Plan" 1966 Sup. Cr. REv. 347, and Mason, Harlon Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61
YALE L.J. 791 (1952).
462. R. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 395-436 (1983). It
was not a general election, Caro reminds us, but an isolated midwinter election to fill a single Con-
gressional seat when the previous incumbent died. Apparently, this west Texas congressional con-
test was the only actual voters' test of the Roosevelt Court-packing plan. Id. at 417.
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widely castigated as the "nine old men." '4 6 3 Yet when the lines were
drawn, the Senate and the nation rallied to the defense of the indepen-
dence of the Supreme Court.4" The "Court-packing plan" was defeated
in Committee and never brought to the floor of either the Senate or the
House.465
The final measure of the Court's success in achieving its goal has been
history, the end-product of its day-to-day-work. In retrospect the Court
itself has seen4 66 that its unfortunate decision in Plessy4 67 in 1896 saddled
the nation with seventy-five years of Jim Crow and enforced segregation.
The unanimous Court in Brown,4 68 where Plessy was recanted and the
road back to depolarization commenced, was gentle in admonishing its
predecessors.469 Yet the verdict of history is clear. Justice Harlan, the
dissenter in Plessy, alone of that Court is remembered favorably.47
The Warren and Burger Courts have been consistent in rejecting in-
roads on the Brown principle against racial segregation and discrimina-
tion.471  But, as Thurow suggests, mere present and future
nondiscrimination is not enough to accomplish depolarization;472 affirm-
ative redress is required. The ultimate effect of premature abandonment
of this remedial weapon-in favor of an individualistic ethic-must, like
Plessy's "separate but equal," await the unfolding of history. But, like
"separate but equal," the outcome of abandonment is predictable to rea-
sonable persons.4 73 And no one can miss the risk.
Justice Jackson also directed attention to the educational function of
463. Leuchtenburg reports that by late 1936 "it had become commonplace to refer to the Jus-
tices as the 'nine old men.'" Leuchtenburg, supra note 455, at 390. He adds: "[lit was the publica-
tion on October 26, 1936 of The Nine Old Men by Drew Pearson and Robert Allen which made the
phrase a household word. The book quickly climbed onto the best seller lists, and it was serialized in
newspapers across the country." rd.
464. Chief Justice Hughes actually wrote a letter to Senator Wheeler which became testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in opposition to the Roosevelt plan. See J. BURNS, supra note
461, at 301-02. Other Justices, even those (such as Brandeis and Stone) friendly to Roosevelt's New
Deal program (which the Court had been opposing) gave signal of opposition to the Executive's
move against the Court. See Mason, supra note 461, at 798, 805.
465. The 10 to 8 unfavorable vote in the Senate Judiciary Committe (in which Roosevelts's own
party was in majority) sealed the fate of the Court-packing plan. J. BURNS, supra note 467, at 306.
466. See supra note 445.
467. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
468. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
469. "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem authority." Id. at 494.
470. Unfortunately, Justice Harlan's plea for a "color-blind" Constitution has been cited of late
to rally opponents of affirmative remedial goals. But as Thurow notes, "To shift from a system of
group discrimination to a system of individual performance is to perpetuate the effects of past dis-
crimination into the present and the future." L. THUROW, supra note 447, at 189.
471. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
472. L. THUROW, supra note 453, at 188.
473. Justice Harlan, in Plessy, had 20/20 vision: "In my opinion, the judgment this day ren-
dered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott case." 163 U.S. at 559.
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the Supreme Court, which is surely in play as the Court confronts these
affirmative action cases in the 1985 Term: "If an organized society wants
the kind of justice that an independent, professional judicial establish-
ment is qualified to administer, our judiciary is certainly a most effective
instrument for applying law and justice to individual cases and for culti-
vating public attitudes which rely upon law and seek justice.1
474
474. R. JACKSON, supra note 457, at 80.
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